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Edward A. (Ted) Parson1
Abstract
One of the fundamental  critiques against twentieth century experiments in central
economic planning, and the main reason for their failures, was the inability of human-
directed planning systems to manage the data gathering,  analysis,  computation,  and
control  necessary to direct the vast complexity of production,  allocation,  and
exchange decisions that make up a modern economy. Rapid recent advances in AI,
data,  and related technological  capabilities have re-opened that old question,  and
provoked vigorous speculation about the feasibility,  benefits,  and threats of an AI-
directed economy. This paper presents a thought experiment about how this might
work,  based on assuming a powerful  AI agent (whimsically named “Max”) with no
binding computational  or algorithmic limits on its (his)  ability to do the task.  The
paper’s novel contribution is  to make this hitherto under-specified question more
concrete and specific.  It  reasons concretely through how such a system might work
under explicit  assumptions about contextual  conditions;  what benefits it  might offer
relative to present market and mixed-market arrangements; what novel requirements
or constraints it  would present;  what threats and challenges it  would pose,  and how
it inflects long-standing understandings of foundational  questions about state,
society,  and human liberty.
As with smaller-scale regulatory interventions,  the concrete implementation of
comprehensive central  planning can be abstracted as intervening via controlling
either quantities or prices.  The paper argues that quantity-based approaches would
be fundamentally impaired by problems of principal-agent relations and incentives,
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which hobbled historical  planning systems and would persist  under arbitrary
computational  advances.  Price-based approaches,  as proposed by Oskar Lange,  do
not necessarily suffer from the same disabilities.  More promising than either,
however, would be a variant in which Max manages a comprehensive system of price
modifications added to emergent market outcomes,  equivalent to a comprehensive
economy-wide system of Pigovian taxes and subsidies.  Such a system, “Pigovian
Max,” could in principle realize the information efficiency benefits and liberty
interests of decentralized market outcomes,  while also comprehensively correcting
externalities and controlling inefficient concentration of market power and
associated rent-seeking behavior. It could also, under certain additional assumptions,
offer the prospect of taxation without deadweight loss,  by taking all  taxes from
inframarginal  rents.
Having outlined the basic approach and these potential benefits, the paper discusses
several  challenges and potential  risks presented by such a system. These include
Max’s need for data and the potential  costs of providing it;  the granularity or
aggregation of Max’s determinations;  the problem of maintaining variety and
innovation in an economy directed by Max; the implications of Max for the welfare of
human workers,  the meaning and extent of property rights,  and associated liberty
interests;  the definition of social  welfare that determines Max’s objective function,
its compatibility with democratic control,  and the resultant stability of the boundary
between the state and the economy; and finally,  the relationship of Max to AI-
enabled trends already underway,  with implications for the feasibility of Max being
developed and adopted, and the associated risks.  In view of the depth and difficulty
of these questions, the discussion of each is necessarily preliminary and speculative.
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Introduction
Artificial Intelligence: Advances, Impacts, and Governance Concerns
Artificial  intelligence (AI)—particularly various methods of machine learning
(ML)—have made landmark advances in the past few years in applications as diverse
as playing complex games,  purchase recommendations,  language processing,  speech
recognition and synthesis,  image identification,  and facial  recognition.  These
advances have brought a surge of popular,  journalistic,  and policy attention to the
field,  including both excitement about anticipated benefits and concern about
societal impacts and risks. Risks could arise through some combination of accidental,
malicious or reckless use,  as well  as through the expected social  and political
disruption from the speed and scale of changes.
Potential  impacts of AI range from the immediate and particular to the vast and
transformative.  While most current scholarly and policy commentary on AI impacts
addresses near-term advances and concerns,  popular accounts are dominated by
vivid scenarios of existential  threats to human survival  or autonomy, often inspired
by fictional  accounts in which AI has advanced to general  super-intelligence,
independent volition, or some other landmark of capabilities equivalent to exceeding
those of humans.  Expert opinions about the likelihood and timing of such extreme
advances vary widely.2  Yet it is also increasingly clear that such extreme advances in
capability are not necessary for AI to have transformative societal impacts—for good
or ill,  or more likely for both—including the prospect of severe disruptions.
Efforts to manage societal  impacts of technology always face deep uncertainties,
both about trends in technical  capabilities and about how they will  be used in social
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context.  These perennial  challenges are even greater for AI than for other recent
areas of technological  concern,  due to its diffuse,  labile character,  strong linkages
with multiple areas of technological  advance,  and breadth and diversity of potential
application areas.3  In its foundational  and potentially transformative character,  AI
has been credibly compared to the drivers of previous industrial  revolutions,
electricity and fossil  fuels.4
In view of these challenges,  analysis and criticism of AI’s  social  impacts and its
governance have tended to cluster at two endpoints in terms of the immediacy and
scale of the concerns they consider.  Most current work targets present or
immediately anticipated applications,  such as autonomous vehicles and algorithmic
decision-support systems in criminal  justice,  health-care,  employment,  and
education,  addressing already present concerns about safety,  liability,  privacy,  bias,
and due process.5  A bolder minority of current work goes to the opposite extreme,
aiming to characterize the implications of some future endpoint of capability—super-
intelligent AI,  or artificial  general  intelligence (AGI),  for example—with attendant
risks to human survival or autonomy. This latter work includes efforts to identify and
develop technical  characteristics that would make AI robustly safe,  benign,  or
“friendly” for humans,  no matter how powerful  it  becomes: in effect,  seeking
practical  (and contradiction-free) analogues to Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics.6
The broad range that lies between these two clusters,  however—the impacts,  risks,
and governance challenges of AI that are intermediate in time-scale and magnitude
between the immediate and the existential—also carries the potential  for
transformative societal  impacts and disruptions,  for good and ill.  Yet despite
admitting some degree of informed and disciplined speculation,  this intermediate
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range has received less attention.7  This intermediate range of AI applications and
impacts is  unavoidably somewhat diffuse in its boundaries,  but can be coherently
distinguished, at least conceptually,  from both the ultimate and the immediate.  The
distinction from ultimate, singularity-related concerns is relatively simple: in this mid-
range,  AI applications are still  under human control.8
The distinction of mid-range from immediate concerns is  subtler,  yet can be
meaningfully drawn in terms of scope of control.  In current and projected near-term
uses,  AI applications advise,  augment,  or replace existing actors (a person,  role,  or
organization) in existing decisions.  They are embedded in products and services
marketed by existing firms to identified customers.  They support or replace human
expertise in decisions now taken by individual  humans,  or by larger groups or
organizations (corporations,  courts,  boards,  etc.)  that are recognized and held
accountable like individuals.  But this correspondence between AI applications and
pre-existing actors and decisions is  historically contingent,  and need not persist  as
AI capabilities expand. In the medium term, AI could be deployed to do things that
somewhat resemble present actors’  decisions,  but at such expanded scale or scope
that their impacts are qualitatively changed, by,  for example,  expanding actors’
power,  transforming their relationships,  or enabling new goals.  Alternatively,  AI
could be deployed to do things not now done by any single actor, but by larger-scale
social  processes or networks,  such as markets,  normative systems, diffuse non-
localized institutions, or the international system. We can envision future AI systems
comprehensively integrating—and presumably aiming to optimize—all  decisions made
by and within large complex organizations.  For example,  we might envision AI
“running” UCLA, the UK National  Health Service,  the State of California,  or as I
explore in this paper,  the entire economy. Deployed at such scales,  AI would take
outcomes that are now viewed as emergent properties,  equilibria,  or other
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phenomena beyond the reach of any individual  decision or centralized control,  and
subject them to unified control,  intentionality,  and (possibly)  explication and
accountability.  Assessment and governance of AI impacts in this intermediate range
would,  more clearly than for either immediate or singularity-related concerns,
require consideration of both the technical  characteristics of AI systems and the
social,  economic,  and political  context in which they are developed and used.
A Thought Experiment: AI-Powered Central Economic Planning
To explore these possibilities,  this paper develops a thought experiment that sits
squarely in this middle range: Could AI run the economy, replacing decentralized
decisions by market actors? Could some plausible extrapolation of rapidly advancing
AI and data capabilities perform the resource allocation and coordination functions
of markets—the functions that twentieth century central planning systems attempted
and so notably failed at—and do it  better than either past planning systems or
markets?
Although this exercise is  speculative,  there are at least three reasons that it  is
worthwhile,  both as an intellectual  exploration with deep historical  relevance and
surprising current saliency and for its practical  implications.  First,  it  provides a vivid
illustration of the potentially transformative impact of AI capabilities that sit  in this
middle range,  not requiring general  or super-intelligent AI systems. Indeed, far from
being implausibly audacious,  its ambition is  comparable to many other expansive
projections,  for good or ill,  of  potentially transformative AI applications.9  Second, it
offers new perspectives on deep, enduring questions of social,  political,  and legal
theory,  such as the definition of social  welfare,  the relationship between economic
and personal liberty,  civil  pluralism, the relationship between the market economy
and the state,  and the boundaries between individual liberties and state or other
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collective authority.  The inquiry informs sharp current political  controversies,  as
rapid progress in AI shifts the ground under seemingly settled questions such as the
distribution of economic surplus between labor and capital, the impacts of economic
concentration,  and the distribution of power in society. 10  Third,  this is  a potential  AI
application whose moral  valence is not obvious a priori  but rather ambiguous and
contingent,  not clearly pointing to either Utopian or Dystopian extremes but
potentially capable of turning in either direction.  It  thus provides rich ground for
inquiry into its consequences and the conditions that would tilt  toward either
societal  benefits or harms,  of specific forms or in aggregate,  and hence may suggest
guidance for near-term policy and legal  responses.
Before getting into details,  I  briefly address the issue of what name to give the AI
who wields this great power.  I  propose “Max.” Among its other virtues,  “Max” is
helpfully gender-ambiguous —but it  being 2019,  Max also needs pronouns.  Here,  I
look back before recent portrayals of uber-powerful AIs as female (for example, Her,
Ex Machina),  to two landmarks from a prior period of social  upheaval:  Kubrick and
Clarke’s HAL 2000 and even further back,  to Roy Orbison. 11  Many of us will  be
working for Max,  if  we are working at all,  so Max is clearly “The Man”—and gets
masculine pronouns.
Max will  have two big advantages over markets in promoting human welfare,  both
consequences of the fact that his pursuit of human welfare would be intentional and
explicit,  rather than indirect and emergent.  Rather than performing a set of parallel,
decentralized,  private optimizations from which one must invoke “invisible hand”
logic to assert good aggregate outcomes,  Max would perform a global social
optimization. This would enable him to correct market failures. This means, first, that
Max can internalize all  externalities,  incorporating both market and non-market
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information to identify and assess external effects and respond appropriately—if not
for all,  then at least for the most serious and uncontested externalities,  such as
environmental  harms,  resource depletion,  over-use of commons,  and the under-
compensated social  benefits of health,  education,  knowledge, the arts,  and civic
institutions.  Max could correct the pricing of fossil  fuels,  agricultural  products,  and
water,  and the salaries of teachers,  nurses,  and social  workers.
Second, Max could reduce or eliminate market power and the associated rent-
seeking behavior. Unlike human-managed firms, Max would not waste effort trying to
create socially sub-optimal market power, or to shift rents or costs under conditions
of existing, widespread market power – except insofar as these shifts somehow bring
aggregate benefits.  These advantages distinguish Max both from pure market
arrangements and from historical attempts at central planning, which had their hands
more than full simply trying to manage production and get markets to clear. My focus
on these advantages also distinguishes Max from other proposals for central
planning based on computational  advances,  which have invoked broad social  aims
such as equality,  sustainability,  and democratic participation but have not worked
through the practicalities of how the proposed systems would improve on market
outcomes in advancing these aims.12
The paper proceeds as follows.  Part I  provides a brief historical  background on the
question of central  planning,  the main arguments for and against it,  and the reasons
that coming advances in AI and related technologies may transform the issue.
Section II  elaborates the task of “running the economy,” asking what it  might mean
concretely and what background assumptions must be specified to make sense of it,
then proposes three alternative models of how Max might operate.  Section III  then
gives a preliminary sketch of several  issues and challenges raised by Max, including
Max’s data needs,  implications for social  diversity and innovation,  the problem of
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defining Max’s objective function,  and the dynamics of how Max might come about,
as well  as what to do about them.
This inquiry presents the clear risk of sprawling over a vast landscape and thus
ending up both speculative and superficial.  To bound the inquiry and help limit  this
risk,  and to distinguish this from an exercise in technological  forecasting,  I  rely on
several  explicit  simplifying assumptions.  The first and most important of these is  an
assumption of computational  capability.  For any computational  task relevant to the
scale of the problem, “running the economy”— millions to billions of people,  and a
similar or somewhat larger order of potential  goods,  inputs,  and production and
distribution decisions13  —Max can do it.  There is  no binding constraint in
computational capacity, bandwidth, or algorithmic ability to optimize a well-specified
objective function: these are assumed to be in unlimited, effectively free supply. This
assumption, adopted for heuristic purposes, also distinguishes this exercise from the
many efforts to characterize the computational  complexity of the economy relative
to presented or projected computing power,  either to demonstrate or reject the
feasibility of control.14  I  simply assume the necessary capacity,  require only that the
assumption pass some minimal threshold of plausibility,  then work through its
implications.  No such simplifying assumption can be made, however,  for the data
Max needs to do his job, which is central to the inquiry and cannot be similarly hand-
waved away.  Relative to other computation-related resources,  generation and
distribution of relevant data is  more difficult,  more contingent on social  and
economic conditions,  more dependent on Max’s precise job description,  and
interacts more strongly with other, non-economic values that are (at least in its initial
specification) outside Max’s job description.  Needed data,  and the constraints and
implications of getting it,  are among the issues discussed in Section III.  The paper
closes with brief conclusions and questions for further investigation.
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I. Historical Context: The Socialist Calculation
Debate
In the twentieth-century intellectual  struggle between the centrally planned,
ostensibly socialist states and the liberal capitalist democracies, two basic arguments
were advanced against socialism. The first was based on liberty and related
normative claims about the proper scope of state authority relative to citizens, most
sharply focused on the relationship between property rights and civil  and political
rights.  The state cannot control  the means of production without impermissible
encroachment on the liberties of citizens.  This critique is normative and
foundational,  independent of the state of technology or other contingent material
conditions.15  The second argument was based on competency—the ability of state
planning systems to efficiently produce the goods and services that people want.
Critics of central  planning argued that no matter how capable the officials running
the system or the resources at their disposal,  central  planning could not match the
performance of decentralized decisions in markets,  but would be perennially
afflicted with shortages,  misallocations,  and wasteful  surpluses.  Unlike the first
critique,  this one is contingent on specific conditions and capabilities.  Even if  it  was
true for all  real  efforts at central  economic planning—as it  almost always was—you
can imagine alternative conditions under which it might not be true. My focus here is
on this second argument.
Although it  has earlier roots,  this argument grew prominent in the early twentieth
century following the Russian revolution.  The most prominent anti-planning
statements were by Von Mises (1922),  responding to a planning system advocated
and partly implemented in early post-war Bavaria by Otto Neurath (1919). 16  Hayek
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(1945) later sharpened and extended Von Mises’s critique, 17  while the most
prominent rebuttal  was by Oskar Lange.  Von Mises and Hayek both argued, in
different ways,  that the equilibrium conditions necessary for competitive markets to
clear and achieve their claimed social  benefits could not be achieved by central
planning because the information needed to do so is  only available encoded in the
prices that emerge from decentralized market interactions in competitive
equilibrium (or more imperfectly through rougher competitive interactions,  even
absent perfect competitive equilibrium).
Against Von Mises’s initial  statement of this thesis,  Lange showed that there is  no
barrier in principle to the same optimality conditions produced by competitive
interactions being attained by central  direction,  guided by a set of shadow prices
playing a role parallel  to that of market prices.  Lange even proposed a practical
process of incremental,  trial-and-error adjustment by which planners could find
market-clearing prices,  analogous to the private-market adjustment process
proposed by Walras.18
Hayek then sharpened the critique,  arguing that even if  planners could in theory
replicate markets’  socially optimal allocation,  the scale of the required data and
computation made the task impossible in practice—particularly considering the vast,
fine-grained diversity of conditions under which people transact (Day-old muffins,
half  price!),  and the dynamism of market conditions with resultant need for rapid
adjustments.  Lange’s response,  published posthumously in 1967,  merely stated that
advances in computing rendered the problem feasible,  even easy. 19
Although the early rounds of this “socialist  calculation” debate occurred before the
development of modern computers,  rapid advances in computation and in
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optimization algorithms—first using analog devices that built  on wartime advances in
cybernetic control, then with digital devices after the mid-1950s—repeatedly changed
the context for subsequent rounds,  albeit  more in theory than in practice.  The
conflict between opposing conclusory assertions—Hayek’s assertion of impossibility,
Lange’s of possibility—was unresolvable,  as it  depended upon contending
speculations about future developments in technological  capability.  And while rapid
continuing advances in both computers and algorithms since the 1950s stimulated
periodic suggestions that the terms of the debate had fundamentally changed,20
there was no concrete evidence that a major threshold of capability had been
crossed. Indeed, the planning problem is sufficiently under-specified that it  is  not
clear precisely what level or type of computing resources would count as the
relevant threshold.  Meanwhile,  the concrete economic and strategic victory of the
liberal  democracies over the Soviet bloc,  and the obvious failure of actual  attempts
at central  planning,21  made the question seem uninteresting.
The debate thus sat unresolved—and arguably unresolvable —for decades.  Lange’s
was the strongest argument for socialist  planning,  but his shift  to directing prices
rather than quantities,  and his leaving final  goods and labor markets outside his
planning system, left  his proposal  an odd, under-specified hybrid.  His proposal  was
criticized both from the left  for not being socialist  enough and failing to guarantee
social  equality and democratic participation,22  and from the right for assuming
perfect,  unified firm response to planners’  directives and for failing to account for
the incentives of managers and entrepreneurs.23  Depending on implementation
details  that Lange did not specify,  either critique—or both—may have been valid.
Moreover,  the arguments over computational  feasibility between Lange and critics
such as Hayek and Lavoie turned on competing unverifiable assumptions about
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future technical  progress and its social  context,24  which were not subject to
empirical  resolution.
Three far-reaching recent changes in conditions,  however,  make it  a useful  time to
seriously revisit  the question.  First,  advances in AI and machine learning,  in parallel
with rapid expansion in hardware-based computational  capacity.  Second, the
explosion in volume, ubiquity,  and usability of data,  particularly the widespread and
powerful  use of proxy data as skilled predictors for things that cannot be observed
directly:  for example,  consumer preferences,  attitudes and dispositions,  and
receptivity to political  messages.  And third,  the growth of sub-systems of the
economy—mainly within large integrated firms and cross-firm networks—that operate
by central  direction under algorithmic control,  rather than human decisions
responding to market conditions.25 These represent large islands of planning that aim
to optimize private, rather than social, objective functions. Under these trends, there
has been some revival  of the planning debate,  although with an unfortunate
tendency to re-contest old questions without specific connections to recent
progress.  Although the most expansive exploration of these issues has been in
speculative fiction,26  there is  also active debate on the left  about the feasibility and
desirability of revived central  planning based on modern computing.27
II. How Would MAX Work?
A. Mechanics of Max: Background Assumptions
How much does Max control? What does “run the economy” mean? Let’s assume
Max won’t  be supplanting human agency,  telling everyone what to do all  the time:
that does not seem aligned with the goal  of advancing human welfare.  Then over
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what actual  decisions is  he given authority? We begin to approach this question by
taking Max’s job description seriously:  Max “runs the economy,” a description that
presumes the economy is not all  of society,  but is  distinguished both from the state,
and from some extensive set of non-economic social  interactions and arrangements.
Let’s stipulate that the economy is the set of processes,  institutions,  and practices
that control  how goods and services are produced, exchanged, and consumed.28
As I  sharpen the thought experiment to make Max more concrete and specific,  at
several  points in the argument additional  assumptions will  be needed, either about
the definition and boundaries of Max’s job or about the social  and political  context
in which Max operates.  My aims in making these assumptions—to keep the exercise
interesting and potentially relevant for near-term decisions—will suggest a few points
of heuristic guidance in what assumptions are most useful.  First,  having already
assumed no computational  constraints I  will  try not to sneak in additional
assumptions about Max’s capability that shatter the (admittedly loose) bounds of
plausibility I  am trying to maintain.  Second, since the purpose of Max is to advance
human welfare,  in specifying how Max works I  will  avoid choices that run strongly
against evident human preferences and values—with the two caveats,  of course,  that
preferences and values may change, and that future political  conditions may favor
deploying actual  AI-based planning systems in ways that do not enhance human
welfare.  Finally,  this thought experiment is  intended to serve as a scenario
exercise—a description and analysis of uncertain future conditions whose purpose is
to inform near-term choices.29  At some points,  this purpose tends to favor assuming
less profound societal transformations, in order to maintain relevance and continuity
with near-term decisions and research priorities.  Throughout,  I  endeavor to make
these assumptions explicit,  and to note where other choices might be similarly
plausible.  For the most part,  I  choose just one path through the dense tree of
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possibilities, with brief observations on potential alternative paths but mostly leaving
these to further development in future work.
The first of these required assumptions concerns the scope of Max’s authority:  in
particular what authority he would have over consumption.  Would Max tell  people
what to eat, wear, do, where to go for dinner or vacation? I assume that he does not,
but rather that people still make their own consumption decisions. I make this choice
partly as a generalization from my own preferences.  I  don’t  like being told what to
consume, both out of an intrinsic preference for autonomy and because others who
try often get my preferences wrong. This is also partly a moral choice—the overlap of
consumption choices with basic liberty interests is too strong to give up, and I worry
that letting people give up this autonomy, even if  sometimes convenient,  may be
incompatible with human flourishing.30  And it  is  partly about Max’s information
needs—consumer choice provides continually updated information about
preferences,  which Max needs and may only be able to get by observing freely
exercised choices.  Rather than specifying consumption,  Max will  do what the
economy already does—determine the options available to me, with contextual
conditions of time and place—and provide relevant information and suggestions.31
A second needed simplifying assumption concerns scarcity versus abundance. To
keep the thought experiment relevant to current decisions and distinct from Utopian
fiction—this is  not Iain Banks’s Culture32  —I  assume that technical  progress has not
eliminated scarcity.  So while consumption is  not specified or compelled,  neither
does it  operate as “it’s  all  free,  take whatever you want.”33  Consumption choices
remain constrained, and any constraint on total  consumption that does not dictate
specific choices will  resemble a familiar budget constraint.  This implies that even
with Max running the economy, absent conditions of post-scarcity plenty there must
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still be money. I have a finite amount of it, although we have not yet considered how
I get it.  And things have prices—or at least,  final  consumer goods have prices.  We
haven’t  yet considered input factors or intermediate goods.
This condition of continuing scarcity distinguishes the thought experiment here from
the most expansive technological-communist reflections,  which broadly assume
technology (omnipresent data,  3-D printing) will  generate conditions of limitless
abundance, under which marginal  costs—and hence prices—converge toward zero.34
In contrast to these visions,  I  assume that production still  requires material  inputs,
many of which will  be in constrained supply even with optimized production
technology,  perhaps increasingly tightly constrained, if  Max’s deployment comes
before human civilization expands beyond the limits of the Earth.  Perhaps the most
decisive constraint on limitless abundance, however,  comes from social  limits to
growth.35  To the extent that many things people desire remain ordinal  or
positional—markers of relative social  status that are intrinsically constrained—even
perfectly optimized production technology will  not overcome scarcity:  the goalposts
will  simply move. With many things people want still  in limited supply,  due to any
combination of material,  environmental,  and social-structure constraints,  the
economy will  still  need an allocation mechanism to determine who gets what.
Although it  may take different forms,  this will  look to consumers like prices and a
budget constraint.
With Max’s authority limited to production,  another assumption is  needed
immediately:  Do people still  work? To pull  the exercise toward relevance for near-
term decisions,  I  assume that Max,  other AI systems, and robots have not replaced
all  human productive activity.  People still  work,  including instrumental or productive
work (working to make things other people want) as well  as intrinsically motivated
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work independent of any demand for the output.  This might be because AI and
robots cannot satisfactorily do every job and people are still  needed,36  or because
people want to work. The number of people working may be far fewer than today but
is not a tiny number.  Enough people are working that allocating and managing them,
and their motivation and welfare,  must be considered in how the economy runs.
With Max running the economy and people still  working,  the next assumption
needed is the nature of the boundary and interactions between Max and human
workers;  in particular,  are there still  firms? In theory,  it  is  possible to have an
economy without firms.37  Every human worker could be a sole proprietor, interacting
with others through contractual  market transactions.38  Firms are artifacts of
information,  principal-agent relations,  and economies of scale,  which make it  more
efficient to gather workers and resources inside organizations with internal
operations controlled by collegial,  normative,  and (mostly)  authority relationships
rather than market transactions.
For the three assumptions discussed thus far,  only one option appears to keep the
imagined world potentially desirable and the thought experiment relevant and
bounded. Max controls production, not consumption; there is still scarcity and thus a
need for some way to allocate output among people;  and people still  work.  On
whether firms still  exist,  however,  and the related question of how human workers
interact with Max, at least two cases appear plausible.  First,  we can assume there
are still  firms,  within which managers contract with human employees and exercise
authority over their work.  Firms may employ AI or robots alongside human workers,
but human managers run the show internally.  Under this assumption, Max’s authority
operates only in the external  environment of the firm. Alternatively,  we can assume
that firms are gone. Every human worker is  then accountable directly to Max, rather
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than to human managers. Workers may still sit together in shared offices, collaborate
with each other,  and hang out by the coffee machine,  but their work is  directed by
Max via a set of contractual  arrangements.
Intermediate cases are possible,  although they probably don’t  all  require separate
consideration. For example, the economy might be mixed. Some firms still operate, in
parallel with a large economy of individual contractors working directly for Max. One
intermediate case that might require separate consideration would be if  some firms
are managed by non-Max AI’s. For this case to be distinct, firm-manager AIs must not
be fully integrated into Max, but rather are separate decision-makers in an agency
relationship with Max. Max’s ability to see inside the firm must be limited,  and
interests must not be perfectly aligned. The firm AIs may have private interests in
their firm’s enrichment or status,  perhaps making their own workers happy or
satisfying their shareholders (if  they still  have them),  or they may disagree with Max
on the aggregate social  welfare function.  Bargaining between Max and the firm
would be AI-to-AI,  and so on more equal footing than Max’s interactions with human
managers.  And of course,  workers’  experience within the firm would be different;
they would be under the authority of their firm’s AI manager,  rather than either
human managers or Max.
On this point, I begin by assuming that firms do still exist, managed by either humans
or AIs.  Max’s main area of operation thus lies outside the boundary of the firm, in
dealings among firms and between firms and consumers.
B. How Would MAX Work II: Quantities or Prices and Applied to What?
What does Max actually do? The simplest possibility is that Max operates just like an
old-fashioned central  planner,  specifying input and output quantities to every firm. I
call  this variant “Quantity Max”.  Max provides your allocation of all  inputs—your
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capital,  workers,  and material  inputs.  They will  arrive on your loading dock,  on the
following schedule.  If  you have a problem with the inputs delivered, you are free to
take it  up with the supplier,  but you’d probably rather deal directly with Max, who
has an excellent record of resolving disputes rapidly and fairly.39  And here is  your
output quota:  how much of each product,  with delivery timing and locations
specified.  With Max’s unlimited computational  capability,  the inputs and outputs all
match up perfectly (subject to stochastic optimization,  to the extent there are still
equipment breakdowns,  snowstorms,  or other uncertainties outside Max’s control).
The most basic challenge for this arrangement concerns the incentives of firm
managers.  Do managers have discretion in how they run things inside their firms?
Presumably they do,  and presumably they are not pure altruists.  We thus expect
them to use their discretion to advance their own interests,  not to act as perfectly
faithful agents for Max’s social  welfare function. And to the extent they do not have
discretion,  why have people doing these jobs and why would anyone want them?40
Max may get the flows of inputs and outputs among firms perfectly.  But just
controlling quantities (plus whatever structure of contracts Max gives managers in
case of variation from these) leaves a serious agency problem. Managers can use
their discretion to advance their divergent interests,  through various forms of rent-
seeking,  cutting quality,  skimming off  inputs,  abusing their workers,  and creating
negative externalities—anything that is  within their scope of authority and
concealable from Max. Moreover,  the problem is not solved by having Max specify
more precisely what the firm does,  including technology choice and other internal
decisions.  As long as there are—by need or choice—firms managed by humans with
discretion,  and private information to make the discretion meaningful,  there will  be
agency problems of this sort.  These can be reduced by more tightly specifying firm
behavior, at the cost of whatever values motivated having human managers; they can
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be reduced to individual-level  agency problems if  there are no firms and every
human worker reports directly to Max; and they are changed in character if firms are
managed by AI’s separate from Max. But all  these reductions carry costs and
tradeoffs,  and none fully eliminates agency problems.
The cause of this problem is obvious;  like old-time central  planning,  this system has
no prices. Oddly, we had to assume prices at the point of final consumer sale to have
meaningful  consumer budget constraints.  But under Quantity Max,  all  input and
production decisions up to that point are made by diktat.  For Max to tack on prices
at final  retail  sale,  without tracking and using them through the production process
up to that point,  fails  to take advantage of available,  high-value information and
communication devices.  Socialist  planners were hostile to prices for ideological
reasons,  but Max doesn’t  have to be.  Max is not an ideologue,41  he’s an
instrumentalist and an empiricist.  He’s looking for ways to advance aggregate human
welfare and willing to adopt new approaches in pursuit  of that end.
We thus consider a second variant of Max,  “Price Max”.  Instead of specifying
quantities,  Price Max specifies prices of all  goods in commerce,  including all  firm
inputs and outputs.  Although Price Max is still  imposing different transaction
conditions than parties would adopt based on private interests alone—and thus
requires effective suppression of black markets to enforce his exclusive
authority—the change from specifying quantities to prices reproduces several  major
features of markets.  Firms are free to organize their operations as they choose,
subject to the given prices they face.  Managers can use this discretion to increase
profits,  which remain within the firm. The things managers do within the market
system to increase profits—for example, shopping around for more suitable or lower-
priced inputs,42  tuning and improving production processes,  motivating workers,
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improving and differentiating their outputs to command a higher price—remain
feasible, potentially effective at increasing profits, and socially desirable. The change
from setting quantities to setting prices reduces many—not all—of the agency
problems present under Quantity Max,  assuming firms can retain a large enough
fraction of their earnings to be motivating.43  Max setting prices instead of quantities
also mitigates liberty concerns related to Max’s direction of labor markets.  Max
setting wages, perhaps also running a clearinghouse to suggest matches of people to
jobs,  better preserves the voluntary nature of work decisions that,  like consumption
decisions,  are too strongly linked to individual  liberty to consider compelled
assignments.
Our assumptions about Max’s optimizing ability imply that Max gets all  prices
right—all  markets clear,  with no shortages or surpluses.  But for Price Max to set
these prices,  he must either independently calculate or observe the same data as is
revealed or generated in market interactions:  the abundance and characteristics of
resources,  their  alternative uses,  the production technologies available to transform
them, and consumer preferences. If he cannot garner exactly the same data, he must
identify good enough proxies to closely approach the same competitive equilibrium
solutions.  Although I  have assumed no effective constraints on Max’s computational
ability,  similarly expansive assumptions about Max’s access to all  needed data are
more suspect.  Data is  the weakest and most troublesome link in the chain of
capabilities this thought experiment requires.  Max might be able to independently
calculate these competitive equilibrium prices. But to the extent the data needed to
reproduce these are not available,  are costly,  or cause harms or violate valued
principles in their acquisition—or,  for that matter,  to the extent there are other
social  values beyond information-generation attributed to market processes of
search,  bargaining,  and contracting—we might prefer not to have Max re-estimate
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these market-clearing prices.  Instead, Max could use the prices that emerge from
independent production and consumption decisions,  transactional  offers and
requests (bids and asks),  in competitive interactions—in effect,  let Max free-ride on
market processes to generate price information.
Great: We’ve come this far, and the best Max can do amounts to reproducing market
prices—like the character in the Borges story who independently “wrote” Don
Quixote?44  In one sense,  we have simply reproduced Hayek’s argument about the
information economy of decentralized market decisions.  But we’re not done. Market
prices provide high-value information, but only as a starting point for Max’s job. Max
is charged with improving on market outcomes when these diverge from social
optimality. The prices Max calculates to achieve this will often be equal or very close
to those emerging from market exchange, but not always;  and the differences are
important.  To illustrate this most clearly,  it  is  helpful  to consider yet a third variant
of Max.
This form of Max would use market interactions to generate initial  prices that serve
as the starting point for every transaction, but would then impose price adjustments
on each transaction as needed to correct market failures.  Insofar as many of the
market imperfections Max must correct can be understood as externalities (both
negative and positive),  we have now re-defined Max’s job as administering a
complete system of Pigovian taxes and subsidies,45  so I  call  this variant “Pigovian
Max.” Pigovian Max would evaluate all  externalities and other market imperfections
(not just as single points,  but as they vary over some relevant range of output),
announce taxes or subsidies, then manage whatever adjustment process is needed to
ensure that markets still  clear.
How would Pigovian Max be implemented? At the level of individual  transactions,
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Pigovian Max might look quite unobtrusive and familiar.  Sellers could post fixed
prices or buyers and sellers could negotiate, as they do under market systems, up to
the point of transaction.  Max would then calculate and add the appropriate tax or
subsidy at the point of sale. The process would be similar to the imposition of a sales
tax, but with two differences. First, the adjustments would vary over transactions, so
buyers and sellers would need to be informed of the adjustment before they commit
to each transaction, presumably via mobile devices, information on sales displays,  or
point-of-sale systems. Second, adjustments could be of either sign,  and could be
large for goods with large externalities.
At larger scale,  how disruptive Pigovian Max would be will  depend on details  of
implementation,  and on uncertainties about the size of the adjustments that require
analysis beyond my scope here.  Max might be relatively unobtrusive,  to the extent
that relatively few goods carry most of the external effects that need correction—for
example negative externalities from fossil  fuels,  water extractions,46  heavy metals,
toxic chemicals,  agricultural  fertilizer and chemical  inputs;  and positive externalities
from provision and dissemination of knowledge, physical  and mental  health,  social
services,  etc.  The system could be implemented at various points in supply chains,
depending on how external effects are distributed across these. Implementing it like
a Value-Added Tax (VAT),47  with Max’s adjustment based on incremental  external
costs or benefits at each stage from primary inputs to final  consumer goods,  would
be a plausible approach.  For goods carrying the largest negative externalities—such
as fossil  fuels in the world of severe climate change—the preferred social  outcome
may involve large reductions in the total  quantity in commerce or complete
elimination.  If  the responsibility of making such large-scale social  transformations
falls  entirely to Pigovian Max’s price adjustments,  these might have to phase in
slowly,  as Max balances the continuing harm caused by the products with the social
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cost of disruption from rapid squeezing out of existing products and stranding
capital  investments.  Alternatively,  the state might use other regulatory tools,  which
will  still  be available to it  even with Max operating,  to pursue these changes.  When
social  goals are pursued partly or wholly through such other regulatory tools,  the
share of responsibility for these issues falling to Max, and the size of Pigovian Max’s
price adjustments,  would be reduced or eliminated accordingly.
III. Designing and Implementing Max: Issues and
Challenges
In discussions of AI,  seemingly prosaic matters of design and implementation lead,
surprisingly directly and quickly,  to deep questions of political,  legal,  and moral
foundations of social  institutions.  As a thought experiment,  Max’s job in part is  to
provoke these discussions.  Max is intended to be taken seriously as an exploration
of a potential  transformative application of AI.  Simply positing Max as a serious
possibility and reasoning concretely through how it  would work clarifies various
conditions,  requirements,  and potential  impacts and risks.  But Max also aims to
provoke questions about the societal  conditions that define his context:  how they
operate,  what they require,  their  impacts,  what they are,  their  operations,
requirements,  impacts,  unrecognized assumptions,  and inter-relationships.
This section addresses this second class of questions.  It  considers Max’s needs,
implications,  and potential  impacts—both promising and troublesome—to probe both
how feasible or desirable Max (or similarly vast AI uses) might be and what new
perspectives Max provides on old questions.  Even more than prior sections,  the
discussion roams over a vast territory,  and is thus necessarily speculative and
preliminary.
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A. Data: What Does Max Need and How Does He Get It?
The central  element of the old socialist  calculation debate,  and the one most
profoundly changed by recent advances,  is  data.  Any form of Max,  like any central
planning system, will  require a vast amount of data to support its calculations.  I
rejected Quantity Max on grounds of agency problems and managerial  incentives,
not data limits. The data needs of managing via prices or quantities may differ based
on the technical  structure of the optimization problem—the relative computational
efficiency of optimizing on primal versus dual variables—but that question is  moot
given the rejection of Quantity Max for other reasons.  The two remaining variants,
Price Max and Pigovian Max, have similar data needs,  but differ in how they fulfill
them.
Consider first the data Max needs to replicate market outcomes insofar as these are
socially beneficial,  such as to generate market-clearing outcomes that are
allocatively efficient in the limited,  Pareto sense.  Max needs data about all  supply
and demand conditions internal  to any potential  transaction,  including inputs,
production technologies,  and consumer preferences.  This is  the same information as
old socialist  planning needed and failed for the lack of,  with the small  qualification
that Max has a somewhat larger job than Lange’s planner,  which did not set prices
for final consumer goods or labor. Both Price and Pigovian Max need these data, but
Pigovian Max relies on decentralized market interactions to generate them, subject
to his subsequent adjustments to correct market failures.  Price Max enjoys no such
short-cut,  but must gather,  integrate,  and analyze all  these data and synthesize the
results to contribute to his price setting for each transaction.
In contrast to the old socialist calculation debate, it is plausible, perhaps even likely,
that the data needed to construct these independent estimates of market prices are
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now available.  This is  particularly clear on the supply side,  for firms.  Relevant
information is  available from multiple sensors doing real-time monitoring of multiple
attributes of production,  distribution,  and sales;  internal  accounting and
management information systems; technical  characteristics and performance data
from machines and equipment,  greatly extended by the proliferation of internet-
connected devices;  and complete records of the training,  skills  and behavior of
workers,  together with relevant outcome measurements.  The sufficiency of these
firm-level data is  barely even a matter of speculation,  given the high reliance on
algorithmically directed planning,  within large enterprises and in supply chains and
multi-enterprise networks organized by a single hegemonic firm (Amazon, the Apple
and Android app stores).  Decisions to coordinate these large-scale operations by
data-guided direction rather than internal  markets strongly imply that the data
needed for efficient production,  cross-enterprise cost minimization,  and
identification and pursuit  of new opportunities is  available,  at least to optimize the
objective function of the firm directing the system.48
Max needs these production-related data not just at the level of single firms,
however,  but for the whole economy. In addition to the computational  challenges
that I  am ignoring,  this shift  to an aggregate perspective raises questions about
incentives for full  and accurate disclosure.  Max would presumably be authorized to
compel data disclosure,  which may be effective for data from direct observations
(equipment sensors,  surveillance cameras),  or other sources not readily subject to
misrepresentation or gaming (internal  managerial  accounting data).  Obtaining
reliable disclosure may be harder for data dependent on human observation and
reporting—most acutely for “tacit  knowledge,” skill-like knowledge that people hold
without being able to articulate,  which played a major role in Hayek’s critique of
planning.  While I  assume that this problem can be kept manageable through
Max – A Thought Experiment: Could AI Run the Economy Better
Than Markets?
by: Edward Parson
| 27
advances in sensors and data management,  together with incentive-compatible
disclosure systems and penalties for outright falsification,  this is  a contestable
assumption.
On the consumption side,  human preferences and welfare are not directly
observable, although advances in neuroscience suggest this may be changing. A host
of related behavioral  data is  observable,  however,  from which machine-learning-
based predictive analytics systems are advancing rapidly in their ability to predict
purchase decisions and related behavior.  Firms collect a huge amount of such data,
and rapid progress in systems, including recommendation engines and personal
assistants,  suggests they may be adequate for Max to do his job.  These data
probably do not present serious problems related to disclosure incentives because
they originate outside firms (even if  firms then collect them),  and so they are less
likely to be deeply embedded in internal  tacit  knowledge.
The data challenges involved with shifting from firm-based to societal  optimization
will  be more serious for consumption-related than production-related data.  Market
systems presume correspondence between consumers’  voluntary choices and their
welfare. This identification relies at two points on the axiom of revealed preference:
first,  if  you chose it  you must have preferred it  given the available alternatives;  and
second, your preferences thus expressed are better indicators of your welfare than
any outside agent can provide. To the extent this proposition is not treated purely as
an axiom, it  is  obviously sometimes false:  people make some choices that clearly
harm them. No comprehensively better way to measure welfare is  clear,  however,
and opening the door to letting others tell  you what you need poses clear threats to
liberty,  via paternalism or worse.  I  mainly address this issue in discussing the
problem of defining Max’s objective function in Section III.F.  But I  flag it  here to
raise the possibility that optimizing for welfare rather than for consumption behavior
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may require different data,  which may be less readily available,  less observable,  or
less well  proxied.  To the extent this is  the case,  even brilliant success advising and
predicting consumption choices may not be sufficient to demonstrate the availability
of data needed for welfare optimization.
The collection and use of consumer data by firms is already raising serious concerns
related to privacy and citizen control over their information, for which various policy
and legal responses are proposed. I do not address these issues, except to note that
the relevant question for my purposes is  how these concerns differ depending
whether the actor gathering your data is  a private firm or Max.  This could go either
way. You might initially object more strongly to data gathering by a quasi-state actor
like Max, although this difference may fade or reverse as the scale and data-
integration capabilities of private firms grow to resemble, or exceed, those of states.
There may,  indeed, be better reasons to trust Max with our data than Facebook,
Google,  or Amazon. Max might,  for example,  be more able and willing than private
firms to implement strong privacy-protective measures,  such as privacy defaults,
strong consent requirements,  or prohibitions on redistributing,  re-using,  or re-
purposing data. On the other hand, privacy-protecting restrictions on data use might
be more disabling for Max than for private firms,  who can obtain information about
consumer preferences from their own interactions as market players.  In any case,
privacy concerns are distinct from my main focus on feasibility,  unless they prompt
an outraged reaction that makes needed data unavailable or unusable.
Relative to Price Max, Pigovian Max has less need for transaction-internal
production and consumption-related data,  because he relies on market interactions
to generate initial  prices based on these.  In addition to assuming that these
emergent prices accurately reflect underlying producer and consumer information,
Pigovian Max must also assume that using market outcomes in this way does not
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impair their validity.49  Transactions under Pigovian Max would occur in two stages,
because transacting parties would see both the initially determined, market-based
price,  and Max’s adjustment to yield the final  price.  This two-stage process might
change behavior and outcomes,  depending on the strength and form of decision
heuristics operating.  For example,  parties might fail  to make transactions that are
advantageous due to strong positive externalities,  if  they do not anticipate Max’s
contribution making it  privately more attractive to them. Alternatively,  if  buyers
exhibit  strong anchoring on the posted pre-adjustment price,  we would expect the
two-stage disclosure process of Pigovian Max to generate stronger responses to
Max’s adjustments than those by parties interacting with Price Max, who would only
see the final  price.50  Pigovian Max might also face gaming of initial  transactions,  or
reduced vigor in seeking advantageous transactions by parties who know Max will
come in after the fact to control  their transactions.  Such possibilities might require
Max to re-check the validity of initial  prices by replicating Price Max’s estimates in
some cases,  thereby reducing his information advantage over Price Max.
Both Price and Pigovian Max also need information related to any effects external to
transacting parties or other market failures.  Relevant market failures are of three
types:  (1)  limited or asymmetric information,  especially given heterogeneous goods
and fine-grained variation of transaction conditions over space and time; (2)
conventional  externalities such as environment,  health,  and safety harms; and (3)
market power.  I  discuss the first  two here and consider market power and its
consequences in the next section.
Broadly,  Max’s assumed capabilities imply that there are no information-related
market failures, but there is a little more to say on this for Pigovian Max. His reliance
on transacting parties’  bargaining as a proxy for all  relevant transaction-internal
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information will  be invalid if  these outcomes reflect limited or asymmetric
information. Pigovian Max thus cannot avoid looking under the hood for transaction-
internal  information;  although he does not need to do this to set an initial,  pre-
adjustment price,  he still  must do it  to identify and correct any information limits.
This need may only apply to certain types of transaction, or may be less burdensome
than Price Max’s construction of prices de novo, but still  reduces Pigovian Max’s
computational  advantage over Price Max.
To correct environmental  and other externalities,  most data Max needs will  be
external  to the transaction,  related to public or externally imposed benefits and
harms. This will  include both scientific and consumer-preference data—information
about the physical  and biological  consequences of economic decisions,  and about
how people value these consequences.  Estimates of citizen’s valuation of
environmental  and related outcomes are presently conducted for benefit-cost
analysis of regulatory decisions,  relying on a combination of behavioral  proxy data
and explicit  value-elicitation surveys.  These methods are quite crude; indeed, there
are controversies over the epistemic validity of such preference estimates separate
from realized market transactions; although, absent clearly better alternatives, these
are extensively relied on in regulatory decisions.51
Whether or not Max can approach some valid stable representation of such
preferences, I am confident Max can construct estimates of these values better than
those produced by present methods.  He could equal them by precisely replicating
present crude data and estimation techniques; and he would almost certainly be able
to deploy his vast data and computational  resources to develop better surveys,
proxies,  and validity-checking procedures.  Max’s advantages would be even greater
in integrating scientific information about causal  mechanisms that link economic
choices to valued impacts.  Max could integrate expert scientific and technical
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knowledge about production processes and their external material and energy flows,
as well  as evolving state-of-the-art understanding of dynamics of environmental
systems that link these flows to changes in valued environmental  attributes.  Under
Max, beliefs about climate change or vaccine effects that were known with high
confidence to be false would play no role in pricing the adjustments for associated
transactions.
Given uncertainty in knowledge of environmental  processes,  Max would also have
the option of taking a precautionary approach.  Such an approach would start with a
stipulated constraint on some specified environmental  burden, defined over the
relevant spatial  scale and the associated producers and consumers.  Such a
constraint could come from a political  process or could be generated by Max based
on analysis of the same preference and environmental  data incorporating some
specified degree of risk-aversion. With that constraint specified, Max would then set
optimal price adjustments to achieve that constraint,  in effect,  taking a cost-
effectiveness rather than a benefit-cost approach.
All  the data required for Max’s calculations will  change over time and so require
monitoring and adjustment.  Indeed, the explosion of complexity associated with
product characteristics varying over time and location was the main basis of Hayek’s
revised argument for the impossibility of central  planning.  This was clearly correct
for human planners,  who could not do continuous updating and so had to specify
uniform conditions over extended periods,  but Max will  be much more capable of
location-specific and real-time adjustments.  As a result,  ironically,  Max will  have less
need for accurate predictions of future conditions than human planners did.  Max
may also be able to identify cases where conditions change slowly or interactions are
weak, and so decide when he can simplify his calculations at small  social  cost – if  his
computation is  not quite costless,  so such short-cuts are worthwhile.  Changes over
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time will  occur in both transaction-internal  conditions and externalities,  but the
latter may present particular challenges of abrupt change.  Scientific knowledge of
mechanisms of environmental  or health harm is occasionally subject to large
revisions from new discoveries,  which might imply sudden changes in Max’s price
adjustments.  As noted above for Max’s initial  phase-in,  his adjustments would then
have to incorporate both the new scientific knowledge of harms and the costs of
rapid adjustments, given the current state of the economy and capital stock. He must
balance the costs of responding too slowly to the environmental  harm against the
disruption of steering the economy too fast in a new direction—or too confidently,
given uncertainty.52
B. Max Does Antitrust and IP: Market Power, Rent-Seeking, and Innovation
In addition to accounting for externalities, Max will be able to manage market power
and related behavior and impacts for maximal social  benefit.  For purposes of
analyzing how Max might do so,  market power can usefully be categorized in three
types,  with different causes.  First,  most jurisdictions create monopolies by
intentional  policy choice through intellectual  property law, with the aim that the
resultant rents will  generate incentives for creativity and innovation.  Second, some
industries are natural  monopolies due to cost structures involving economies of
scale or scope, which give large firms decisive advantages in terms of lower cost or
ability to offer more attractive goods or services.  Third,  market power can be
created through firms’  efforts to erect barriers to entry against new competitors,
using a wide variety of technological, strategic, marketing, policy, or legal means that
subsume but are more extensive than the prior two mechanisms.
In all  these cases,  market power – and firms’  resultant ability to raise prices or
otherwise gather rents – is  socially harmful.  The third type,  market power through
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artificially produced barriers to entry,  represents a pure social  harm with no
offsetting benefit.  Moreover,  such advantages are often secured through explicit
rent-seeking efforts, which present additional social costs with no net benefit: Those
pursuing the rents benefit  if  their  efforts succeed, of course,  but at the cost of
larger losses elsewhere.  The second type, market power due to economies of scale
or scope, also represents a net societal  harm, not due to contrived efforts to seek
rents but to the cost structure of the industry.  Either large fixed costs create
economies of scale,  as in utilities with costly distribution networks or other
traditional  natural  monopolies.  Or strong network effects create economies of
scope, enabling larger producers to provide some combination of better products or
services,  or lower costs.  Economies of scale and scope create real  advantages to
being large,  which tend toward market domination and resultant inefficiencies,  even
without the additional  harm of rent-seeking behavior.
Both these types of market power produce social  losses as firms raise prices or
restrict supply to secure rents.  For both types,  the core of Max’s response is to
adjust prices to reduce or eliminate the rents. In the first type Max should target the
rents, not the rent-seeking behavior, because the ways to erect barriers to entry are
too varied and numerous to control  them all,  and the rents—given Max’s assumed
computational  capability and data access—are relatively easy to observe.  Even if  the
boundary between normal capital  returns and rents is  contested and imperfectly
observable (since it depends, among other things, on the riskiness of the enterprise),
even approximately eliminating the rents will  greatly reduce or eliminate incentives
for rent-seeking,  so this response – with adjustment and correction over time – is  a
complete solution.  In the third type,  where market power was artificially created
through rent-seeking behavior,  extracting the rents will  promote a return toward
competitive conditions as rent-seeking behavior declines.
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In the second type, however,  the tendency toward market power is  inherent in the
market’s cost structure and will not be eliminated by extracting the rents. Moreover,
having one or a few firms dominate such markets is  socially advantageous.  The
problem is not the market domination per se,  but the resultant opportunity to raise
prices and accrue rents.  The solution again is  for Max to set prices to capture the
rents.  Using Max in this way effectively reproduces rate-of-return regulation for
natural  monopolies,  except that this response is applied not just to a few pre-
identified natural  monopolies but to any firm accruing significant rents.  Modern
monopolies,  however—internet platforms and others whose market power comes
from network externalities—present one additional  complexity for Max.  Many such
firms exploit  their market power partly through transactions that are unpriced,
based on the exchange of attractive free services for personal data,  often under
terms of service that obscure the terms of exchange. While there may be close
analogies to conventional  market power in firms’  ability to impose these terms,  it  is
not clear that these relationships are fully analyzable in terms of market power.  To
the extent these firms act like monopolists, this will be clearer in the pricing of other
related transactions,  such as selling targeted advertising based on aggregation of
user-provided data.  The correct policy response is unclear,  and may depend on
regulations related to data ownership and use that would be separate from Max.
Assuming such policies are in place and effective,  the remaining job for Max is once
again identifying and extracting the rents—a job for which the data needs are similar
to what Max is already using:  firms’  technological  possibilities and internal
accounting data,  plus consumers’  preferences provide a good basis to characterize
economies of scale and scope and the rents derived from them.
The third type of market power raises more significant policy challenges.  Society
benefits from creation and innovation,  and IP law confers market power in order to
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create incentives for these activities. Past economic planning efforts did not perform
well  on this score,  and were criticized for being dull,  rigid,  stodgy,  and lacking in
innovation.  Effectively promoting variety,  innovation,  and creativity,  will  represent a
challenge for Max distinct from those discussed thus far.  How could Max effectively
promote these values—at least as well  as,  or hopefully better than,  the present
system of markets plus IP law?
To consider this question,  it  is  useful  to separately consider different degrees of
scale and novelty in innovation.  At the smallest scale,  innovation blends into variety
in markets,  as diverse products and designs are offered to cater to heterogeneous
tastes and preferences for novelty.  Markets do this pretty well,  typically providing a
mix of high-volume goods for mainstream tastes and differentiated or unique items
for minority tastes.  For Max to match or beat this performance is largely a data
problem; if  he has sufficiently fine-grained data,  he should be able to identify both
consumer preferences and production opportunities for a wide variety of goods.
Neither Price Max nor Pigovian Max decides what is offered in commerce, of course:
they only set prices or price adjustments for products that market actors are already
offering. Max can use his price-setting authority to promote variety by being alert to
variation and change in consumer tastes and rewarding producers who offer novel or
non-standard products that some people want.  He might further increase the
rewards to novelty,  by treating consumers’  preferences for a variety of items being
offered even if  they do not presently consume them as an option value that
represents a positive externality.  Moreover,  with a small  broadening of his job
description,  Max could prompt producers about potentially attractive opportunities
when he detects a preference for variety that is not being met. In addition, Max’s job
of discouraging non-beneficial  market concentration will  tend to promote variety of
products,  as a side-effect of promoting diversity of firms.
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As we consider innovation that extends beyond present product variation,  Max may
not be able to observe preferences for novel goods that are not presently offered.
He could explore tastes or production opportunities beyond the present margin by
inflecting prices to actively promote small  variation,  then prompt producers about
opportunities and promote their exploration through small  variation in prices.  In
effect,  Max would then be conducting small  experiments,  encouraging producers to
offer new things for sale (by a combination of suggestions to firms and favorable
pricing),  then tracking results and adjusting offerings in response (again by
combination of providing information,  offering suggestions,  and favorable pricing).
These small  changes to Max’s operations could give modest boosts to innovation—at
least small, incremental innovations, more akin to fashion and design innovation than
technological  innovation—via what I  call  a “William Gibson” mechanism.53
If  such small  exploratory innovation on the margin of current offerings is  judged
insufficient,  Max could promote larger innovation by conducting technological  R&D,
or even scientific research.  This would represent a substantial  expansion of Max’s
job description.  It  would also present a large-scale policy choice,  regarding whether
to favor (in either direction) innovation and creativity by people,  or by Max and
other AIs.54Max could search over existing and proposed technologies and related
patents and scientific and technical  literature,  to identify promising margins for
advance. There are already signs of AI systems exhibiting such capabilities;  for
example,  an AI system’s recent victory in a scientific contest to predict the folded
structure of proteins from their amino-acid sequences,55  not to mention AI’s growing
success in writing genre fiction (an AI was a runner-up in a recent novel-writing
contest),56  and composing derivative but likeable music in specified styles.57
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There may be subtle risks in relying on Max for innovation and creation.  The
products of human creativity may differ from Max’s output or may be valued more
highly for intrinsic reasons even if  not observably different.  Alternatively,  creative
outlets and activities might be judged necessary for human agency or flourishing.
Moreover,  innovation and creation—even technological  innovation,  but especially
artistic,  social,  and political  innovation—sometimes bring disruption and conflict.  The
creative impulses may originate in specific dissatisfactions or frustrations,  in
aspirations for self-definition and expression,  or in novel political  or social  visions;
and they may both be provoked by,  and provoke, some degree of irritation,
disagreement,  or outrage.  Any of these may provide reasons to limit  Max’s role in
innovation or creation—for example,  if  Max’s prolific output discourages human
creators,  or if  the ease and reliability of innovation by Max undercuts important
processes of social  innovation by reducing friction and dissatisfaction,  and so subtly
impairs individual  or societal  agency.
If  it  is  judged important to motivate creation and innovation by humans,  either in
parallel with or instead of Max, Max could design and implement policies to motivate
these,  probably better than current IP policy.  He could provide incentives using the
same bundle of policies occasionally proposed as alternatives to IP,  either ex ante
by creator’s wages or cost reimbursement,  or ex post by lump-sum prizes or price
premiums added to uses of your creative work.  He might even be able to assess the
social  value of innovations,  and on that basis set optimal incentives to promote
socially advantageous innovation without conferring large windfall  rents.
C. Max’s Granularity: Individually Tailored or Aggregated Determinations?
A key question in defining Max’s responsibilities will  be at what scale of aggregation
he determines prices or price adders.  Will  groups of sufficiently similar transactions
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be aggregated, in effect treating them like one market with one price or price-adder?
Or will  Max make separate calculations for every transaction,  unique to each
combination of buyer,  seller,  and item transacted?
This question cuts surprisingly deep in how Max is designed and what aims he is able
to pursue.  If  Max is conceived as an externality-fixing and rent-extracting machine,
the answer will  depend on much these vary across transactions,  and thus at what
level of aggregation differences among transactions matter for social  optimization.
You might expect that for large numbers of similar products,  made in the same or
similar factories,  differences in externalities across transactions might be very small.
Similarly,  rents might accrue to firms at a similar rate across large number of
transactions.  Under these conditions,  there might be small  losses from social
optimality in aggregating across large numbers of transactions,  with large reductions
in computational  and data burden (once again,  if  computation is  not really costless,
so we care about these burdens).
At the same time, assessing each transaction individually would open up a powerful
range of additional  policy goals for Max,  presenting both the potential  for large
benefits,  and substantial  risks.  Assessing each transaction individually,  Max could
consider multiple attributes of both the product exchanged and the parties to the
transaction,  including not just transaction-specific externalities but also
determinants of individual  supply and demand characteristics,  or even additional
party attributes beyond these. Considering supply and demand characteristics alone,
Max could know buyer’s and seller’s  reservation prices for every transaction,  and so
replicate perfect price discrimination,  with the difference that,  in contrast to either
price discrimination by a monopolist  or bilateral  bargaining,  Max can divide the
available surplus from every transaction in line with his social  welfare function.  This
division would presumably reflect some reward to low-cost producers and some
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benefit-sharing to buyers with high willingness to pay,  partly replicating the
differential  distribution of surplus that would occur if  transactions are aggregated
into quasi-markets.
But Max could also deploy this capability in other ways.  He could,  for example,
operate as a powerful engine to reduce social inequality by shading each transaction
incrementally in that direction:  in contrast to typical  outcomes in present market-
based systems, Max could charge poor buyers less and pay poor sellers more,  so
each transaction contributes a small  reduction to inequality.  Perfect price
discrimination for individual  transactions would also enable Max to take some share
of every transaction’s surplus at a tax. This would represent perfect taxation with no
allocative inefficiency (or deadweight loss)  because all  tax revenues would come
from infra-marginal  rents and thus have no allocative effect.58
Individual  adjustment of every transaction also raises clear concerns.  At a minimum,
individualized transaction assessment loses the liberating anonymity of market
transactions—a loss of privacy, although I suspect privacy is gone in Max-world in any
case.  People have scarcely more privacy from Max than they do from an omniscient
deity,  although Max could still  protect people’s private information from other
people and organizations.
But there are other concerns presented by individualized transaction assessments,
related to the bases on which Max makes these decisions.  I  have described Max’s
principal  role as correcting market failures and have highlighted examples of
traditionally recognized externalities that are large and mostly uncontroversial,  such
as environmental  harms plus knowledge, health,  and cultural  spillovers.  But
individualized transaction assessments,  in addition to letting Max conduct fine-
grained calculation and correction of externalities,  would also create temptations to
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broaden the conception of externalities in ways that begin to resemble
comprehensive social  engineering,  raising potentially serious concerns about liberty
and autonomy. As technological progress so often does, the possibility of Max opens
news margins of individual  and collective choice that never previously had to be
considered, for which decisions are now required whether,  and how, to use them.
For example,  consider the prospect of treating employee welfare—a phenomenon
that is  important,  highly variable,  and largely unpriced—as an externality of
production.  Firms and managers sometimes make their workers miserable,  and labor
markets are not so perfect that unhappy workers reliably move to alternative
employment that increases their welfare.  Max could treat this as a compensable
externality,  penalizing producers and sellers by imposing what would amount to an
“unhappy worker tax.”  But if  Max is authorized to treat abusive managers as a
correctable negative externality of production,  what is  to stop him from doing the
same for people who act badly in other ways,  or in other roles? Much human
behavior harms other people even if  it  takes place outside the workplace.  With Max
in place,  there would be obvious temptations to intervene more expansively,  making
individualized judgments of social  merit  based on observed or inferred behavior or
attitudes.  Some earnest social  planner might want Max to tax people with secret
vices outside their work lives,  grumpy people,  people with dis-favored religious
beliefs,  strange-looking people,  and so on.  Markets already do this,  of course,
rewarding or penalizing people for things that are irrelevant to their participation in
economic production—or should be—but Max would create the ability to either
reduce such differentiated treatment or increase it,  potentially without bound.
Such capabilities would present the worrisome prospect of drifting toward
meddlesome and invidious discrimination to support whatever values,  preferences,
and prejudices are presently dominant—among the majority,  or among whoever gets
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to influence Max’s objective function—and a broader descent to a profoundly
illiberal  state.  The same individualized determinations that enable Max to perfect
the pursuit  of social  optimality also enable him to exercise unassailable,
individualized tyranny through complete control  of individuals,  even over matters
well  within the zone of presumptive individual  liberty,  by pricing their labor and
defining the terms of all  their  consumption opportunities.  Max could operate like a
Twitter mob, except deploying more powerful,  authoritative sanctions.  These
concerns provide strong reason to worry about the definition of Max’s objective
function,  discussed in Section III.F.  below.
D. Work Life and Worker Welfare Under Max
I  am describing Max in terms that are a blend of old-fashioned technocratic and
playful,  but we must not under-estimate the gravity of political  transformation that
Max could represent,  or the intensity of associated political  conflicts.  The most
salient dimensions of potential  conflict over Max are likely to be between workers
and employers (the managers or owners of enterprises) and between those at the
top, middle, and bottom of the socio-economic status hierarchy. These dimensions of
division evoke Marxism, and appropriately so. Max raises questions of the ownership
and control  of the means of production in a comprehensive and fundamental  way,
and so directly raises intense,  long-standing political  struggles.
So is Max socialism59 —and if he is, is that a bad thing or a good thing? Or to focus on
real  effects rather than political  labels,  what would Max mean for the life and
welfare of workers and for the magnitude and determinants of social  inequality? My
assumptions for the exercise put some constraints on these questions.  People still
work,  but far fewer than today.  And they do so not just as vocations or in pursuit  of
intrinsic aims, but also to contribute to the production of desired goods and services
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in the economy, to some degree in response to extrinsic motivations.
The large-scale displacement of labor thus assumed is as transformative a shift  as is
having Max run the economy. Yet it  is  still  also a limited assumption,  because the
displacement of labor is  not complete.  There are large numbers of people both
working and no longer working.  The thought experiment thus raises two deep
questions,  both long central  to the ideological  conflict between socialism and
capitalism—the nature of working life and welfare of workers,  and social  equality.
Firms and other large organizations,  even those that participate in markets
externally,  mostly operate internally not by market transactions but by authority-
backed planning.  They are thus simultaneously islands of planning within market
systems, providing a powerful  rebuttal  to simplistic ideologies of how capitalist
economies operate;60 and islands of authoritarian control of workers by management,
not organized along democratic principles.61  Workers submit to these relationships
for multiple reasons,  but a predominant one has been that they need the income.62
The assumed scale of Max’s authority raises both questions in new forms. If far fewer
people are working, it is no longer either feasible or morally acceptable to use wages
from employment as the main basis to distribute income and other social  rewards.
But if  these are not determined by outcomes of labor markets,  then who gets what
and how is it  decided? Are all  equal,  as per simple proposals that the policy
response to AI is  a universal  basic income (UBI)? Or if  they are still  differentiated,
then on what basis? Is Max involved in these determinations? These supremely
important questions about how to respond to AI-driven displacement of
employment,  and the inadequacy of UBI as a response, are topics of intense current
debate,  but I  do not engage them here.
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But even if  Max is not involved in the overall  determination of rewards and the
degree and basis of social  inequality,  I  cannot fully avoid the question of how Max
engages with the terms and conditions of employment for those who are working,
because these questions are tightly connected with Max’s job of running the
productive economy. Recall  that Lange’s planning system excluded labor markets
and final  consumption goods from its scope, oddly leaving these areas to market
interactions.  That represents one a possible answer in my thought experiment here,
but it  is  still  necessary to work through the question and the implications of this
along with other possible answers.
The question of the conditions and terms of those working is  tightly connected to
the questions of who is working,  who decides,  and on what basis.  Who still  has jobs
in the presence of Max? This will  be determined by some combination of who wants
to work, and what skills are still needed. This determination will have to consider the
intensely heterogeneous character of work and jobs,  both in their desirability and in
the skills  required to do them.
Assuming there is  some acceptable system in place to distribute societal  resources
among people—as there must be under any manner of profound AI-driven disruption
of labor markets and the broader economy, whether controlled by Max, market
forces,  or other means—it can no longer be intolerable to be unemployed. As a
result,  the threat of such intolerable life conditions will  no longer be available as an
incentive to induce people to work (independent of the question whether it  will  be,
or ever was,  morally acceptable).  Some people will  want to work,  for intrinsic
reasons.  This might be few people or many,  so it  is  not clear in general  whether
human labor is  likely to be in shortage or surplus.  Moreover,  whatever the supply-
demand balance for general  human labor overall,  the economy will  continue to
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require labor from people with specific skills  that cannot yet be automated.
Working will  still  mean some degree of relinquishing control  and submitting to
direction.  That will  be the case under any system of large-scale production
coordination,  by any combination of markets,  central  planning by Max, or authority
relations within firms. For people working directly for Max outside firms, that control
will  be implicit,  operating through the set of price opportunities or adjustments that
Max offers for working on particular tasks.  Within firms,  additional  control  will  be
exercised by managers,  whether these are people or AI.  Absent some magical
harmonization of collective consciousness, the terms of work life can be neither fully
voluntary for individual workers nor fully democratic at the collective level, given the
need for some larger-scale coordination mechanism.
Firms operating under Max will  still  have to organize production effectively and
control  costs.  Moreover,  subject to Max’s vigilant policing of the magnitude of rents
allowed, they will—and must for their internal  decision-making to reliably align to
large-scale societal needs—have incentives to earn profits. Utopian visions aside, this
implies that firms must still  sometimes direct employees to do things they would
rather not do and must sometimes dismiss workers who are not contributing or
whose skills  are no longer needed. But at the same time, the human stakes of labor
markets will  be greatly reduced under Max, reducing or eliminating coercion to take
employment.  This will  represent a fundamental  transformation in the conditions of
workers’  lives.
The complete experience of employment—meaning the wages or other
compensation,  the character of tasks and the environment in which they are
performed, the interactions with co-workers and managers,  and the compatibility of
employment with other life aims and responsibilities—must in total  be attractive
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enough to induce people to choose to do it,  under the conditions of greater
voluntarism that follow from the overall  reduced need for workers.  How attractive
these conditions must be will  depend on the conditions of shortage or surplus that
prevail  for workers with particular skills.  The greater the shortage,  the more
attractive the inducements for employment must be.  We might generally expect the
likelihood of shortage to be greater for specialized skills,  although this need not
necessarily be the case.  When there is  shortage,  employers will  offer higher
incremental  wages (incremental  relative to what the workers they need can receive
for not working) or other attractive inducements. Under conditions of worker surplus
for particular job types,  this will  not be the case.  Indeed, we might even imagine
some areas where there is  little or no need to pay incremental  wages above what
non-workers receive,  still  assuming that those life conditions available for non-
workers are broadly perceived as acceptable.  Even with more people wanting to
work than firms need, the changed conditions of unemployment will  put a floor on
how miserable workers can be—a floor that is  not present in current labor markets.
Employers’  market power over terms of employment will  still  vary with the shortage
or surplus of particular skills  but will  never be as extreme as when loss of
employment is  catastrophic.
Should Pigovian Max be involved in setting wages and terms of employment? (Price
Max obviously will be.) I propose provisionally that he should not, under assumptions
of full  information in worker-employer bargaining and no externalities directly
caused by employment decisions.  Externalities from other related decisions can be
corrected in the transactions where they arise. If you work on a destructive product,
Max will correct that externality elsewhere in production inputs or final product sale,
with no need to intervene in your wages.  Under those conditions,  Max can leave
negotiation of employment,  wages,  and other working conditions to market
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bargaining between workers (perhaps advised by their AI assistants)  and their
prospective (human or AI)  employers.63
E. Same Old Communist Tyranny? Property Rights and Liberty Under Max
Where the prior discussion of worker life under Max partly addresses potential
objections to Max from the left,  this section aims to address some objections from
the right.  Even if  Max doesn’t  amount to state seizure of private property,  isn’t  Max
close enough to raise all  the same objections—seizure of control  if  not formal
ownership without compensation,  and threats to the associated liberty interests of
both firms and citizens? In early discussions of this project,  the sharpest forms of
this criticism—appropriately,  in view of their experience—have been raised by
colleagues with personal or family experience living under the Soviet Union or other
ostensibly socialist  authoritarian states.  These critiques suggest that a serious
proposal  to adopt Max is at best naïve about foreseeable ways Max would amount
to,  or foreseeably lead to,  tyrannical  state power.
It  is  clear that Max is an instrument of centralized coercion on market transactions,
and hence on the use and control  of private property,  at least for private property
involved in production. But the degree of control, and thus the extent of intrusion on
liberty,  will  vary strongly under different forms of Max.
I  rejected Quantity Max for reasons of agency problems and incentives,  but that
form of Max would also represent the most extreme seizure of state control,
compelled production and exchange. Depending on how he is implemented, Quantity
Max might also entail  compelled labor.  His unacceptability thus appears to be
overdetermined, based on both ineffectiveness and impermissibly extreme violations
of liberty.
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Price Max and Pigovian Max would still  represent coercive state intervention, but to
lesser degrees.  Production and exchange transactions would not be compelled,  but
would be subject to centrally imposed conditions.  For Pigovian Max, these
conditions are imposed as price adjustments to transactions that are otherwise
voluntary.  In form, they would thus resemble a system of comprehensive sales or
value-added taxes,  suggesting by analogy that this degree of intrusion is  not a
categorically impermissible restriction of liberty,  and may be justifiable in view of
the public aims being advanced. This may be sufficient to establish the permissibility
of Max,  but this will  depend on the details.
In contrast to familiar sales-tax systems, whose purpose is to raise government
revenue, Max’s purpose is mainly to steer economic production in socially favored
directions and correct market failures,  while perhaps also raising revenue as a
secondary aim. Given this purpose,  Max’s price adjustments will  be more variable
across transactions than those of sales taxes,  including some of both signs,  and in
some cases will  be much larger.  Under Max’s direction,  some products with
extremely high negative externalities may be driven out of commerce,  and some
enterprises whose business model is  mostly or entirely based on creating or shifting
rents may be driven out of business.
These aims in principle lie within the legitimate purview of democratic states.
Indeed, mixed market-regulatory systems often pursue the same aims,  although by
various forms of explicit  regulation less integrated with market transactions than
Max would be.  At this level  of speculative generality,  it  is  clear that Max,  at least in
his Pigovian form, is  not fundamentally impermissible in liberal  democratic states.
But the details  matter.  Max would raise political  controversy,  as conventional
regulation does,  including the possibility of claims that strong interventions amount
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to impermissible uncompensated takings of private property.  And any form of Max
will  be a powerful  tool,  making authoritative determinations on behalf  of the state
whose consequences are sometimes severe for particular enterprises or the value of
particular assets,  even if  not matters of life and death. He will  thus require vigilance
that he only be deployed to advance broadly defensible,  widely shared societal
interests,  not as an instrument to impose,  explicitly or subtly,  one faction’s vision of
the good life,  or their interests,  on others.  The conditions that determine whether
Max is compatible with a liberal  state and society will  be fuzzy and context-specific.
They will  depend on Max’s objective function and the process by which it  is
established, as discussed in the next section.  They will  depend on some criteria of
proportionality of costs imposed relative to benefits pursued—partly a matter of
accurate and trustworthy estimation of social  harms,  partly a matter of limiting
disruptions by phasing in large changes gradually,  for Max as for conventional
regulation.  And they will  depend on procedural  recourse as protection against error
and corruption,  including provisions for explanation of decisions,  independent
review, and correction or compensation as judged warranted.
F. What’s the Goal? Max’s Objective Function and How It Gets Decided
We now come to the two hardest clusters of questions that Max presents. First, what
goal does Max pursue in guiding his interventions,  and how—and by whom—is this
decided? And second, how might we get to Max: what pathways from present
conditions to a society with Max in place might be feasible,  likely,  or desirable;  how
do these relate to present capabilities and trends;  and what pitfalls  and risks do
these pathways present? I  deal  with the first  set of questions in this section,  the
second set in the next.
What goal,  what conception of social  welfare,  does Max pursue? In technical  terms,
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what is Max’s objective function, and how is it determined? I have presented Max as
an alternative—or in the case of Pigovian Max, an augmentation and corrective—to
markets.  Market systems have a claimed normative foundation,  originating in the
“invisible hand” metaphor in Smith’s Wealth of Nations64  and later formalized in the
two fundamental  theorems of Welfare Economics.65
This normative claim depends on a few strong assumptions.  The widely recognized
and often-violated assumptions required for conditions of perfectly competitive
markets—full  information,  no market power,  no externalities—define most of Max’s
job as discussed thus far,  so I  do not address them further here.
But there are two other, more foundational assumptions on which the claimed social
optimality of market outcomes depend. These assumptions allow markets—or more
precisely, defenders of markets’ optimality—to avoid certain hard problems that most
forms of Max cannot.  First,  market optimality claims presume that people’s market
choices reliably reveal their preferences and their well-being.  Second, these claims
rely on a definition of social welfare, Pareto optimality, which excludes consideration
of interpersonal welfare comparisons and distribution.  These assumptions together
allow a thin conception of social welfare, which avoids the need to define an explicit
social  welfare function but at the price of being silent on many points of clear
importance for total  societal  welfare,  notably,  but not only,  distribution and
inequality.
Could Max get away with a similarly thin conception of social welfare, and thus avoid
an explicit  welfare function? This will  depend on how broadly or narrowly his job is
drawn. In its narrowest conception—Max only modifies each transaction to correct
for information disparities,  market power,  and externalities—it is  conceivable that
Max could do this job,  or approximate it,  without an explicit  social  welfare function.
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Max could correct information limits or disparities between transacting parties.  He
could assess rents using internal  accounting information from producers,  perhaps
augmented by comparative information from other firms in similar businesses.  He
could assess and correct externalities based on scientific knowledge about
biophysical mechanisms of harm and estimates of people’s valuation of the resultant
end-states.  To the extent external  harms and benefits operate as public goods that
affect multiple people, assessing their aggregate effect requires adding up individual
effects and thus that these be expressed in commensurate terms,  but does not
require explicit  interpersonal comparisons.
But Max also has the opportunity—or the duty—to allocate the available surplus from
every transaction after he has taken account of externalities and rents. In doing this,
he could take various simple approaches that can be defined from parties’  relative
valuations within the transaction,  and thus do not require an explicit  social  welfare
function.  He could,  for example,  divide surplus in some given proportion between
buyer and seller—equally,  or in the same shares as the parties would have realized if
Max had not intervened—applying such proportional  division either to the entire
available surplus,  or to that portion that remains after Max takes some share as tax
revenue.66
But any more ambitious approach that Max might take—including any approach that
does not treat all  transactions the same after accounting for externalities and
market-concentration rents—must rely on characteristics of the parties external  to
the transaction,  such as their wealth or other characteristics.  Providing guidance for
such choices requires an explicit  social  welfare function to define what count as
better or worse social  outcomes.  As in many other applications,  the shift  to AI-
directed decisions requires explication and codification of values and tradeoffs that
Max – A Thought Experiment: Could AI Run the Economy Better
Than Markets?
by: Edward Parson
| 51
may be left  ambiguous or implicit  absent such central  direction.
Assuming Max is ambitious, and thus does require an explicit social welfare function,
the task of defining it  can be separated into two parts:  defining individual  welfare
and aggregating across individuals to define overall  social  value.  These two parts
present different difficulties,  and challenge different parts of the edifice of
assumptions and arguments underlying normative claims for market outcomes.
First, how does Max define and measure individual people’s well-being? In doing this,
Max has a harder job than present AI systems, which only aim to predict
commercially relevant behaviors:  purchases,  engagement,  click-throughs,  and the
like. As noted above, normative claims for optimality of markets depend on assuming
all  these behaviors are aligned with your well-being,  via one or another form of the
axiom of revealed preference: if  you do it,  you must want it  (relative to available
choices);  and if  you want it,  it  must make you better off.  This axiom provides a
powerful foundation for liberal  states:  assuming you know what you value and act to
pursue it  is  generally preferable to assuming I  know what is  good for you.  On the
other hand, the assumption is  obviously false in many cases.  People often make
choices that are bad for them in a reasonably objective sense,  e.g.,  in self-harming
activities and use of recreational  and performance-enhancing drugs that are
addictive or harmful. And people often do, or fail to do, things that they later regret:
not exercising enough, not saving for retirement,  or spending too little time
cultivating meaningful  activities and relationships.  Indeed, many business models
depend on exploiting these misalignments,  by taking advantage of impulsive
behavior,  distraction,  or weakness of will.
We would want Max to avoid these clear pitfalls,  ideally to do comprehensively
better. But this ambition raises serious risks, including paternalism, loss of autonomy,
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or imposing one group’s values on others,  which require proceeding with great care.
These risks are mitigated for Max in his Price or Pigovian forms, because he only has
power to modify prices,  not to tell  you what to do.  Max will  discourage you from
drinking or smoking by raising the price you face for alcohol or cigarettes67 —perhaps
encouraging moderation rather than abstinence by dynamically changing prices (I
want another drink;  Wait,  it  costs how much?) —but not saying you can’t  have them.
He might even recycle the revenues realized from these high-priced transactions for
your benefit,  by directing them to your future health-care or retirement expenses
rather than sending them to either the distillery or the treasury. But while this price-
based approach reduces Max’s coercive power over you,  that power can still  be
substantial.  Max must only wield it  in service of your considered interests and
values,  not slide over to me (or anyone else) specifying how you should live or what
you should want.
To achieve this balance,  Max needs a model of your welfare that avoids pathologies
of choice but that still  represents your vision of your welfare.  It  must represent a
considered view of your interests and values that is  not distorted by unconsidered
habit or impulse;  is  not manipulated by other parties for their own advantage;  that
takes account of how you want to be,  even when your present behavior diverges
from that vision;  and that appropriately reflects intertemporal  tradeoffs,68
uncertainty, and the welfare of other people and values outside yourself – but that is
still  yours.  Or at least,  since Max’s authority is  limited to the economy, he needs a
model of these things for you insofar as they are implicated in your economic
transactions.69
To form this model, Max can draw on the same behavioral data firms already use and
are developing,  both data that pertains uniquely to you and generalizations inferred
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from other people. If Max is sufficiently trustworthy that we consent, he may also be
able to draw on data not necessarily available to firms,  such as medical  data,  or
internal  physiological  and neurological  observations,  present and past.  But Max’s
biggest advantage in forming this model of your welfare is  that he does not have to
do it alone. Like present proposals for AI-enabled personal assistants, Max can work
with you,  observing you and asking you about your preferences,  aspirations,  and
feelings about your past choices and hypothetical  future ones,  to refine and update
his model of your welfare. Operating in this way, Max looks more like a life coach or
counsellor than an economic planner: indeed, this vision of Max is very similar to the
approach proposed by Stuart Russell  as a safety measure against AI assistants
making serious errors when they act on your behalf.70  Such a personal AI assistant
would be concerned with many other choices in addition to your participation in
economic transactions,  however,  raising the question of whether this assistant
should be some other AI-enabled agent,  distinct from Max, whose information and
concerns are limited to you. Such a personal AI agent—let’s call him Mini-Max—would
closely resemble Russell’s  faithful personal AI assistant,  except that,  as the guardian
of your personal welfare,  he would be responsible for passing on to economy-wide
Max (“Big Max”) a subset of the information he holds about you, which is relevant to
your preferences and welfare as they are connected to your participation in
economic transactions,  and the effects on you of externalities from others’
transactions.  This is  the information about you that Max needs to incorporate your
welfare into his price-adjustment decisions.  The rest of your interactions with Mini-
Max,  and the rest of his knowledge about you,  are not needed by Big Max and can
stay private between the two of you.
Even with a valid assessment of everyone’s welfare as affected by economic
transactions,  Max will  still  need to aggregate to a collective measure of social
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welfare.  Because Max is serving in a liberal  state—not a theocratic one,  not one that
tries to implement a universal  Kantian approach to ethics (except,  perhaps,  in
criminal  law, which remains the state’s business,  not Max’s)—that measure of social
welfare must be some form of utilitarian summation of individual  welfare measures
as they pertain to economic activities.  Any such aggregation requires weights
attached to each person’s welfare. While giving equal weight to everyone’s welfare is
an obvious default  choice,  there may also be legitimate bases to give some people’s
welfare stronger weights than others’.  In particular,  under conditions of social
inequality,  it  may be permissible,  or even morally required,  to give larger weights to
the welfare of those worst off.  Moreover,  any aggregate welfare measure must
consider the relative weights to give to economic versus non-economic contributors
to welfare;71  conditions at different times;  and conditions that apply under different
realizations of uncertainties.  Except under the assumption that all  these dimensions
are correctly embedded in the individual welfare measures passed to Max, the social
welfare function must represent collective judgments on these matters.
Although fully specifying Max’s objective function is  beyond my scope here,  this
discussion suggests the problem can be approximated by specifying a few
parameters.  If  we assume that Max’s social  welfare function is  some basically
utilitarian aggregation of individual  welfare measures,  which takes appropriate
account of inequality,  time, uncertainty,  and economic versus non-economic
determinants of welfare,  this suggests that specifying the function might be closely
approximated by setting values for four parameters:  (1)  a measure of aversion to
inequality to be used in setting relative weights for better and worse-off individuals;
(2)  a discount rate or other parameter to set the relative weighting of outcomes at
different times;72  (3)  a measure of risk-aversion to weight outcomes under more or
less favorable resolutions of uncertainties;  and (4) a relative weighting of material
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consumption and non-economic contributors to welfare such as environmental
conditions.
This last parameter,  the relative weighting of economic and non-economic
contributions to welfare, is likely to be the main instrument controlling the aggregate
size of economic output under Max. If the material and energy flows associated with
production,  which determine environmental  impacts,  cannot be arbitrarily reduced
toward zero,  then environmental  conditions will  define the limits on the aggregate
scale of the human productive enterprise.  In a world of greatly reduced need for
human labor in production,  such environmental  constraints are likely to be more
tightly binding than any limit  on production that arises from people choosing leisure
time over employment.
In addition to asking what Max’s objective function is,  we must also consider the
process by which it is chosen. Although Max mostly represents a technocratic vision,
this is  a point where democracy must come in.  Defining a collective conception of
social  welfare is  an intrinsically political  process,  which must have people in charge
working through some democratically legitimate mechanism. In considering how to
do this,  the assumptions already made have simplified matters considerably.
Measures of individual  welfare emerge from the interactions between people and
their AI-enabled personal assistants, while the aggregation to social welfare has been
reduced (for purposes of argument) to setting values for a few powerful,  readily
understandable parameters.  Without denying the advantages of expert-driven,  even
technocratic,  decisions for complex,  largely instrumental  decisions in pursuit  of
broadly agreed political  ends,73  this decision agenda is sufficiently clear and simple
to place it  within the capabilities of many different democratically legitimate
processes. For example, you can imagine this as a legislative task, by which values for
the major parameters of Max’s objective function are explicitly enacted and
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periodically revised in statute.  You can also readily imagine these as being matters
of explicit  debate in electoral  politics,  or being delegated to novel democratic
processes such as juries of randomly selected citizens.  You could even imagine the
task being delegated to some expert administrative agency under legislative
articulation of some higher-order aims to be advanced by the choice,  assuming (in
U.S.  law) this decision survives the resultant constitutional  challenge on non-
delegation grounds.
The biggest risk associated with Max’s objective function is  the risk of capture.  One
irony that Max presents is that while one of his major jobs is reducing market power
and associated rent-seeking in particular markets, the centralized political process of
defining Max’s objective function represents a concentrated opportunity for rent-
seeking that overwhelms all  others.  Anyone able to inflect Max’s decisions to serve
their aims,  even slightly,  would be in a position of unprecedented power—to gain
rapid wealth even beyond the dreams of tech-startup founders,  or to shape society
to their vision.  Worse,  the exercise of such power might be concealed by Max’s
status as a seemingly objective,  neutral  artifact.74  Restricting the political  agenda to
setting a few highly aggregated parameters partly addresses these concerns.75  These
parameters do not allow the manipulation of small-scale details  that would be
needed to distort Max’s decisions to a few actors’  material  advantage,  and they aim
to promote a democratic dialog on basic political  values.  But it  is  a long way from
these high-level decisions to Max’s actual  operations,  with many intervening steps
that are more technical  and opaque, over which many actors would love to exercise
quiet influence.  At the level of generality of this discussion,  there is  no more to say
here beyond exhortations to vigilance about such manipulation,  as much
transparency as is  feasible in the process of designing,  training,  and implementing
Max, and procedures for recourse for those harmed by Max’s decisions.
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G. Getting to Max (And Avoiding Dangers Along the Way)
Max is a thought experiment,  intended to be speculative and provocative.  Yet part
of the purpose of the exercise is  to argue that Max is not crazily remote from
present capabilities and trends.  Many elements that could make up Max-like
capabilities—rapid expansions in computational  capacity,  algorithms, data,  and data
integration and analysis tools—are already present or in development.  These are
mostly developing under private control  to pursue commercial  interests,  or under
state control  to pursue military and geopolitical  advantage,  but not exclusively.
There is  also substantial  research underway in universities and publicly supported
research institutions,  some of it  loosely organized as a pursuit  of “AI for good.”
In this section I  shift  from how Max would work as an endpoint to considering
possible transition pathways by which Max, or similar capabilities, might come about.
Any such pathway will  involve a combination of technical  and socio-political
developments.  I  sketch three transition pathways that are sufficiently distinct and
(to varying degrees) plausible to merit  examination.
The first,  and seemingly simplest,  pathway would involve some jurisdiction deciding
at some future point to adopt Max wholesale by political  choice.  Such a choice
would lie within the authority of states, but would raise several immediate questions
and challenges.  Even assuming the needed capabilities existed,  were ready to
deploy,  and confidently judged to work,  the administrative scale of such a transition
would be vast.  It  would require a massive roll-out and testing of infrastructure and
systems before switching on,  then some form of switch-over,  perhaps at a long pre-
announced moment during a period of reduced economic activity such as a near-
universally observed religious holiday.  The transition bears some resemblance to
occasions when countries have reversed the direction of road travel,  although the
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change would be much larger (albeit  one not involving a risk of head-on collisions).76
Adopting Max would be a huge decision,  beyond the authority of any administrative
or executive process but requiring some democratically legitimate political  process,
legislative or perhaps constitutional.  And it  would present a chicken-and-egg
problem regarding capabilities. Making such a choice would likely require confidence
that needed capabilities are available,  would work reliably,  would deliver the
promised benefits,  and would present no severe risks.  But such confidence could
only be available after some long period of prior development and testing,  which in
turn would require prior political  decisions to support these.  Even those prior
decisions to develop and test the capability would surely encounter stiff  opposition,
from those with strong ideological  commitments to markets and from those
benefiting from precisely those social  harms—rents from market power,  and
uncharged negative externalities—that Max would target. In view of these difficulties,
I  suspect that adopting Max by explicit  political  choice would be highly unlikely,
absent strong changes in political conditions such as an economic crisis so severe as
to weaken the blocking power of incumbents.  Even seeing Max operating
successfully in other jurisdictions,  while it  might help (and thus imply that the first
move would be the hardest),  would probably not help enough absent a crisis.
A second possible route,  potentially mitigating the extreme barriers for the first
route, would involve early development, testing, or adoption of Max at smaller scale,
among groups with more enabling political  conditions.  Possible early demonstrators
and adopters might include jurisdictions that already have substantial  shares of the
economy in state enterprises or under state control;  or those enterprises for which
majority control  already resides in some coalition of large sovereign wealth funds
(Hello,  Norway).  Even jurisdictions with little state control  of the economy could
develop and test Max through government procurement,  as governments often do
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for early support of environmental  technologies.  Max might also be developed
through progressive expansion from small, early, opt-in communities. These might be
any group of individuals and organizations connected tightly with each other and less
so with others—like religious groups,  social  or political  experimenters,  or relatively
isolated political  and economic jurisdictions—who would let Max,  better now called
“Pre-Max,” control  their production and exchange relationships with each other.
Any such group of early adopters would face a few obvious challenges.  They would
have to port and modify capabilities from other uses,  which in turn would require
that these capabilities be sufficiently and verifiably adaptable to their new purpose
and setting. Alternatively they could develop the new tools and systems themselves,
in which case they would need the resources to do this.  Perhaps,  given the novelty
and importance of the experiment,  they could attract philanthropic support.  The
initial  group would have to be large enough and separate enough that their
interactions with each other represent a substantial  fraction of all  their  economic
interactions.  And to the extent they do trade with the rest of the world,  they would
need to ensure that such trade does not undermine Max whenever his prices diverge
from private-market prices.  An analogous problem would arise with any deployment
of Max,  at any scale.  Whatever scope of transactions is  given to Max, his authority
over those transactions must be exclusive:  black markets must be effectively
prohibited,  and exchange across the boundary of Max’s authority must not negate
his adjustments.  In the case of international  trade,  Max’s adjustments would have to
be applied in parallel  to traded transactions to avoid arbitrage opportunities,  like
proposed border tax adjustments on traded goods to preserve the effectiveness of
greenhouse-gas or other environmental  policies.77  For this to be a viable transition
pathway,  Max must work well  enough—perhaps after some early start-up phase
carried by the enthusiasm of early adopters and start-up philanthropic support—that
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there are clear aggregate benefits to working with him that are visible to outsiders.
A third pathway,  more continuous with present trends,  would involve continued
expansion and consolidation of Max-like capabilities in the private sector,  to the
point where a few enterprises or networks control a large fraction of the economy. It
is  widely noted that as the scale of platform monopolies grows,  they increasingly
resemble states and exercise similar authority, although without provisions to ensure
democratic accountability.78  Assuming some degree of concentration of private
economic planning (and power) is  widely viewed as unacceptable,  Max could come
about through some future political  decision to take over and re-purpose the
systems. This would not be a seizure and public re-purposing of physical  capital
assets,  but of AI systems and associated data,  although that nicety would hardly
make the decision less wrenching and conflictual.
This pathway relies on two assumptions.  First,  it  presumes that some future
historical moment allows a wholesale takeover of concentrated private power that is
then judged to have become intolerable,  amounting to a large-scale reconfiguration
of power between private and public actors.  This would be a revolutionary change,
carrying the risks of disruption and violence that typically attend revolutionary
changes.  Second, it  presumes the technical  feasibility of re-purposing a set of AI
tools and data developed for private purposes to serve Max’s public aims.  This may
not be fully possible, as some of Max’s responsibilities—like assessing individual well-
being,  valuing externalities,  and measuring rents—are not required of present
systems serving private interests.  To the extent the existing tools and data cannot
perform these tasks,  they would represent separate,  new development
requirements.
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Conclusions: What This Gets, Leaves Out,
Challenges Unearthed
As a speculative exploration, this exercise does not lend itself to strong conclusions.
Yet it appears to have yielded a few provisional observations and insights, which at a
minimum suggest guidance for further exploration and research – including
identifying some points of potential  near-term guidance,  for research and for early
development of governance capabilities to manage risks.
First,  I  contend that the exercise has established some degree of plausibility for the
hypothesized AI-driven central  economic planning – under the admittedly strong
assumptions made about technological  capabilities.  The exploration identified
multiple developments underway that point toward the future capabilities assumed,
and found no show-stoppers.  Although this claimed demonstration of plausibility is
highly qualified, it  is not a trivial  conclusion, since the exploration of different forms
of Max under different contextual  assumptions gave widely divergent views of their
plausibility,  with one variant of Max—Quantity Max in the presence of some degree
of continued human managerial  agency—presenting apparently insuperable
obstacles.
More broadly,  the exercise substantiated the general  point that profoundly
transformative applications and societal impacts from AI and related capabilities are
plausible – with the potential  for both great benefit  and harm – long before the
conventional  mileposts of AI that transcends human capabilities and control.  I  have
argued elsewhere for the importance of these “intermediate-range” AI capabilities
and impacts,  and for their distinct character from both near and long-term issues—in
particular in their requirement for integrated examination of both technical
characteristics of AI systems and the economic, political, and social context in which
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they are deployed.79  While it  is  defensible to focus predominantly on technical
characteristics in considering long-term risks,  and on human interests and decisions
in considering current applications and their impacts,  neither of these simplifying
assumptions is  apt when considering intermediate-range capabilities and impacts.
Max is surely not the only example of a plausible,  profoundly disruptive potential  AI
application that falls  in this middle range – indeed, this exercise suggests the value
of thinking through other possibilities of similar transformative scale – but the
detailed examination of Max and his implications hammers home the importance of
these more vividly than the prior,  more general  arguments.
More specifically, the exercise of digging down to the particulars of Max’s operations
and consequences yielded several  suggestive insights,  each offering useful  guidance
for further analysis and inquiry.  First,  it  appears that alternative conceptions of how
Max might be implemented differ starkly in their feasibility,  requirements,  and
attendant obstacles and risks.  In particular,  the idea of Pigovian Max – a central-
planning based implementation of a comprehensive system of Pigovian taxes – is  a
novel and promising vision of hybrid private-public control  of economies,  not
previously considered in debates over central  economic planning.  Pigovian Max
appears to offer the prospect of three major advantages,  subject to all  the requisite
caveats.  He appears potentially able to retain the efficiency and liberty advantages
of private market systems while also correcting their most prominent failures.  He
also appears to offer the prospect of taxation without excess burden, albeit  at the
cost of aggressively individualized scrutiny of citizens’  preferences.  And finally,  he
appears to offer the prospect,  through management of the parameters of Max’s
social  welfare function,  of bringing large-scale economic management under
effective and informed democratic control,  without losing the advantages of private
markets.80
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Second, even this preliminary investigation suggested that data and data integration
needs may differ strongly over different forms of Max and jobs given to him – e.g.,
assessing individual  welfare,  pricing externalities,  identifying and mitigating rents
from market power,  assessing and improving quality of working life,  and promoting
valued innovations and creative works.  Moreover,  these data needs may also differ
strongly from those needed to predict and manipulate commercially relevant
behavior for the benefit  of counter-parties.  Assessing these needs for specific aims,
meeting them without unacceptable harm to other values,  and learning how to
integrate private data about individual  welfare with enough sharing to enable
effective social  optimization,  will  all  be important research areas.
Additional  areas of further inquiry suggested by the exercise include the preferred
mechanisms for promoting innovation and creativity and innovation in society,  in the
presence of computational  capability that can greatly accelerate and optimize at
least those innovation mechanisms that depend on searching presently available
information;  and the content,  structure,  and means of defining an aggregate social
welfare function.  The initial  inquiry into this latter question suggested that it  might
be much less difficult  than widely assumed, but the high stakes involved suggest
viewing this optimistic initial  speculation skeptically.  Further critical  investigations
into potential  forms of social  welfare function that are precise enough to guide
Max’s decisions but also clearly and simply parametrized enough to support
meaningful  democratic decision-making are of high value;  as is  investigation of
alternative democratically legitimate processes and institutions to conduct this
parameter-setting process.
A particularly interesting area for further inquiry provoked by the exercise would be
examining more limited deployments of Max.  If  the comprehensive,  economy-wide
Max discussed here is  for some reason infeasible or unacceptable,  might variants
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with more limited scope provide many of the proposed benefits with less cost,
disruption,  or obstacle? Max’s scope might,  for example,  be limited to enterprises
over a specified scale,  or to sectors identified as presenting especially large
externalities or tendencies to market power and rent-seeking.  A particularly
interesting variant would limit  Max’s authority to capital  markets,  either overall  or
jointly with a scale threshold.  In this variant,  “Capital  Max” would allocate,  or more
likely price-adjust,  capital  to enterprises,  replacing or operating in parallel  with
private capital  markets.  Capital  Max would presumably use the same objective
function as economy-wide Max. Since this function would consider both the private
and public effects of enterprise operations,  Capital  Max would not precisely
replicate the behavior of either private capital  markets,  or past efforts to allocate
capital  in line with political  aims.  Consequently,  the well  known critiques of these
past efforts would not necessarily apply,  any more than the old critiques of
comprehensive central  planning would apply to economy-wide Max. Hints that
Capital  Max might be feasible and advantageous come from two lines of evidence:
first,  the extent to which capital  allocation is  already automated, via index funds,
trading programs, and other algorithmic systems, which suggests that the change to
Max might merely require adjusting the objective function;  and second, the
likelihood that key points in capital markets exhibit substantial market power, as well
as systematic biases and choice pathologies.  Capital  Max might thus be able to
gather low-hanging fruit,  operating in parallel  with and out-competing existing
private capital-allocation mechanisms – thus,  ironically,  subjecting them to increased
market discipline.  Viewed in this way,  Capital  Max would not aim to abolish Wall
Street,  but merely to subject it  to real  competition and thus make it  work better.
Identifying these questions for further research and the associated stakes re-affirms
one observation made in the introduction.  It  is  widely noted that large technological
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change can drive transformative societal  change,  disruption,  and conflict.  But such
changes can also explicate and disrupt foundational  shared assumptions that
underpin the norms, institutions, and power structures of society. In particular, these
may depend on assumptions about what people can do to each other that are
technology-limited,  but not recognized as such until  the technology changes.  This
exercise has targeted long-settled assumptions about the moral  and instrumental
effects of markets versus central  economic control,  but other unexamined
foundational  assumptions – in particular about the extent and form of power that
some can exercise over others – may face similar disruptions under large-scale
technological  change.
Max, in particular his Pigovian form, presents three ambiguities,  which should be
kept in mind when considering his potential  implications.  First,  is  it  ambiguous to
what degree Pigovian Max would represent an incremental reform or a revolutionary
transformation.  I  began the project as an intentionally extreme speculation about
technological  change and its implications.  But elaborating the practicalities of
implementing Pigovian Max made him increasingly look like a feasible,  even
incremental  reform: an adjustment to improve a basically capitalist  system, drawing
on well established legal, institutional, and administrative capabilities, which appears
quite compatible with a liberal  democratic state.  This claim must be qualified,  of
course,  because implementation details  will  matter greatly:  some variants of Max
would clearly be so heavy-handed in their imposition of central  control  as to be
incompatible with basic liberties. It might be a small step, easy to stumble over, from
using price adders to correct clear externalities and rent-seeking,  to adding
incentives for sociability, pleasing others, conformity, docility, piety, or obedience to
current political authorities. Any suggestion that Max might be a modest incremental
change to the architecture of capitalism must reckon with these risks – and also with
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the challenge,  discussed below, of finding a feasible and non-violent transition
pathway that leads from here to Max.
A second ambiguity concerns the aggregate normative evaluation of Max: would he
on balance be good or bad for human welfare? I  began the exercise agnostic on this
point,  and reached the unsurprising conclusion that it  could go either way,
depending on design and implementation details  that an inquiry at this high level of
generality cannot resolve. Yet this experience also cast into sharp relief the strength
of normative priors that animate other writings on this question, and how thoroughly
and confidently these priors lead directly to the conclusions.  This observation
applies equally on both sides of the debate: on the one hand, to the growing number
of socialists writing on AI central  planning,  who know – with little consideration of
alternative implementation details  or contextual  conditions – that it  would be good;
and on the other hand, to the unnamed recent essayist in the Economist, who knows
with similar prior confidence that it  would be bad.81  It  appears clear that further
investigations of this issue should link their normative assessments to explicit  and
specific assumptions about how central  planning is  implemented and what
capabilities it  draws on,  in what context – even at the cost of yielding less clear and
less predictable answers.
A third ambiguity concerns how to characterize Max’s job,  in particular as regards
what he is  replacing.  Although the starting aim was for Max to replace “the market,”
working through the details  led to a preferred form of Max,  Pigovian Max, who lets
the market operate then applies socially optimal adjustments to the resultant prices.
Since controlling externalities and market power are canonical  state functions,  this
makes Max look more like a comprehensive regulator – a state actor – than a market-
like coordinating mechanism. Moreover,  at each point in the argument where I
proposed expanding Max’s purview to include additional functions, these also looked
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more like state than market functions – or perhaps functions of the non-
governmental charitable sector. Yet Max is not – and probably cannot and should not
be – all  of the state.  The state does more than regulate,  and even its regulatory
functions are not limited to economic transactions.  The state-market boundary is
already fuzzy and contested, a point for which working through Max provided a
helpful  reminder.  But introducing Max complicates,  partly dissolves,  and moves this
state-market boundary.
In closing,  I  return to the question of Max’s plausibility,  and to the most disturbing
issue raised by the exercise. I claimed above that Max passes some threshold test of
plausibility,  but plausible does not mean likely.  Even a more complete and
persuasive demonstration that a fully implemented Max would raise no impossible
conditions would not necessarily imply a feasible or acceptable transition path to get
from here to there.  A technological  artifact of Max’s scale and complexity does not
arise spontaneously, but must be pursued and developed by actors who can mobilize
the needed (albeit uncertain) scale of expertise, resources, and authority. Max’s real-
world feasibility will  thus depend on both needed technological  capabilities and
favorable social  and political  conditions.  In this regard,  the fact that Max-like
capabilities,  or large parts thereof,  are already present or in development – with the
crucial  difference that these developments are in private hands and aim to advance
private or sectional interests, not broad public ones – cuts both ways, both for Max’s
feasibility and for the prospect of AI bringing broad human advances.  Two sobering
implications follow.
The first concerns the risk of lost opportunities.  There may well  be prospects for
mid-term AI developments that could bring profound advances in human welfare,
whether through something like Max or through other applications in health,
environment, education, or government. But if the specific technical requirements to
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realize such broad benefits differ greatly from those being pursued by private
actors,  then near-term RD&D decisions,  plus path-dependency,  may foreclose the
prospect for such transformative future benefits.  The severity of this risk depends
on the portability and adaptability of capabilities – how readily those developed for
private or rival purposes can be adapted to serve public or universal ones – which is
deeply uncertain.
The second implication concerns the medium-term implications of continued
dominance of private actors and interests in guiding development of increasingly
powerful  AI capabilities.  Continued expansion of capabilities could become self-
reinforcing – not in the oft-proposed sense of AI systems themselves growing
unboundedly powerful  through recursive self-improvement,  but in the sense of
capabilities controlled by human actors recursively strengthening the concentration
of social,  economic,  and political  power in those actors’  hands.  Perhaps even worse
than the loss of potential  human-liberating capabilities,  such trends could lead to
profoundly dystopian futures,  whether these come about with a bang (violent
upheaval)  or a whimper (incremental  loss of human welfare,  agency,  and hope).82
These dire possibilities suggest the value of large early investments in development
of AI and related capabilities that are explicitly targeted at comprehensive public
benefits. This may sound obvious, but it may in fact be the most radical suggestion in
the paper,  because such efforts might not just differ greatly from present privately-
driven developments,  but also from present small  “AI for good” efforts,  in at least
two respects.  First,  the needed development efforts would not erroneously assume
that economic development benefits to the sponsoring jurisdiction – the growth and
competitive success of enterprises located there, or the successful tech-industry job
placement of students trained there – are identical  to the aggregate public benefit.
Second, they would not presume that the technological  capabilities developed for
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private commercial  advantage will  be readily and without limit  re-deployable in
pursuit  of non-commercial  public purposes.  This will  be the case to some degree,  of
course, and a development program seeking public benefit should not needlessly re-
invent wheels that can equally well  be installed on public and private vehicles – but
how much, in what particulars,  and for how long this will  be the case is  deeply
uncertain,  and it  would be naïve for a publicly motivated development effort to
assume comprehensive,  continued complementarity between these.  I  recognize that
the implications of this conclusion for resource requirements are large – and at odds
with present trends in public-private division of resources and authorities – but the
risk of continued, uncritical  reliance on the assumed complementarity of
technologies to advance competitive or rival  interests and to serve broad public
ones,  appears too large to ignore.
Dan and Ran Emmett Professor of Environmental  Law, Faculty co-Director,  Emmett1.
Institute on Climate and the Environment,  UCLA School of Law. This project was
supported by the AI PULSE project,  made possible by a generous grant from the
Open Philanthropy Project.  For thoughtful  comments on prior versions of this
paper,  I  thank Seth Baum, Rod Dobell,  Sara Jordan,  Richard Re,  and workshop
participants at UCLA (“AI in strategic context,”  May 21,  2018),  and ETH-Zurich (Law
and Economics symposium, Feb 20, 2019).  Remaining errors,  follies,  and
eccentricities are entirely my own.
See surveys reported in Seth D. Baum, Ben Goertzel,  & Ted G. Goertzel,  How Long2.
Until  Human-Level AI? Results From an Expert Assessment,  78 TECHN.
FORECASTING & SOCIAL CHANGE 1,  185–95;  see also Vincent C Muller & Nick
Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial  Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion,
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2014),
https://nickbostrom.com/papers/survey.pdf;  Katja Grace et al.,  When Will  AI
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Exceed Human Performance from AI Experts,  62 J.  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
RESEARCH 729 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08807.pdf; Janna Anderson & Lee
Rainie,  Artificial  Intelligence and the Future of Humans,  PEW RES. CTR. (Dec.  10,
2018)
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ed-martin-ford-book.  For a critique of the predictive validity of such elicitation
exercises (because no area of present expertise implies predictive skill  on such
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Elicitation in Support of Decision Making for Public Policy,  111  PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACADEMY SCI 7176 (2014).
A frequent observation,  even at meetings of AI experts,  is  that no one knows “what3.
AI is”—a characterization that distinguishes AI from other current areas of
potentially transformative technological  advance.
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https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/andrew-ng-why-ai-new-electricity.
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Other approaches relevant to medium-term impacts include highly scalable impact
mechanisms such as labor displacement,  social  rating systems, or autonomous
weapons Ajay K.  Agrawal et al.,  NBER Economics of Artificial  Intelligence
Conference (2018),  https://www.economicsofai.com/nber-conference-2018/;  NBER
Conference,  Toronto 2017,  ECONOMICS OF AI (2017),
https://www.economicsofai.com/nber-conference-toronto-2017/.
As much as anything in a massively complex socio-technical system can be said to be8.
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See,  e.g.,  VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING9.
CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA (2018);  ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON AND
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(1945).
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ECONOMICS (1899,  tr.  William Jaffe 1954).
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See,  e.g.,  Cottrell  & Cockshott,  supra note 13;  Mark Jablonowski,  Markets on a20.
(Computer) Chip? New Perspectives on Economic Calculation,  75 Sci.  & Soc’y 3,
400-418 (July, 2011); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Socialism Against Markets? A Critique of
Two Recent Proposals,  27 ECON. & SOC’Y 407,  422-428.
The two experiments that briefly suggested promise of more success were both21.
foreclosed by political  events before they matured and were effectively tested:
early deployments of Kantorowitz’s optimization methods in Soviet planning under
the post-Stalin liberalization (grippingly recounted in the odd history/fiction hybrid
of Spufford’s “Red Plenty”),  and the Chilean Cybersyn experiment under the
Allende government,  directed by the British cyberneticist  Stafford Beer and
foreclosed by the 1973 Pinochet coup (See Eden Medina,  “Cybernetic
Revolutionaries”,  MIT Press 2011).  See also the extensive online discussion of
Spufford’s Red Plenty and its implications for current issues in economic planning at
http://crookedtimber.org/category/red-plenty-seminar/.
Paul Craig Roberts,  Oskar Lange’s Theory of Socialist  Planning,  79 J.  POL. ECON.22.
562,  563-64 (1971).
Egon Neuberger,  The Plan and the Market:  The Models of Oskar Lange,  17 AM.23.
ECON. 148 (1973).
Cottrell  & Cockshott,  supra note 13;  at 89.24.
For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see Herbert A.  Simon, Organizations25.
and Markets,  5 J.  ECON PERSP. 25 (1991).  For a recent commentary on the rapidly
expanding scope of planned systems in the economy, see PHILLIPS & ROZWORSKI,
supra note 10.
With a Utopian flavor in the Iain Banks “Culture” novels, and with a dystopian flavor26.
in many places,  but in my view with the most illuminating detail  in Charles Stross’s
“Accelerando” (Orbit,  2005).
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See, e.g., Brian Merchant, Fully Automated Luxury Communism, GUARDIAN (May 18,27.
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/mar/18/fully-automated-lu
xury-communism-robots-employment.  See also PHILLIPS & ROZWORSKI,  supra
note 10.
This includes state action when the state acts through voluntary interactions to28.
produce, exchange, and consume goods and services,  but excludes state action
when the state deploys its coercive and normative authority,  or other control
mechanisms (if  there are more) on which it  holds a monopoly.
For an extensive methodological discussion of the development, design, and uses of29.
scenarios,  see Edward A. Parson,  Useful  Global-Change Scenarios:  Current Issues
and Challenges,  ENVIRON RES. LETT 3 (2008).  See also Edward A. Parson et al.,
Global-Change Scenarios:  Their Development and Use,  US GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM “SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT PRODUCT 2.1B” (July
2007),  https://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2007/2007_Parson_pa09200l.pdf
The other choice here would skirt  perilously close to the dystopia portrayed in the30.
Pixar film Wall-E.
On this point,  it  is  important to avoid false dichotomy. Max’s involvement in31.
consumption choices will  not be all-or-none, and the details  matter.  Max would
probably inform, curate,  and recommend consumption choices,  presumably also
offering a (revocable) option to simplify my life and let him choose for me. This
intermediate approach is clearly more compatible with liberty than having Max make
consumption choices.  It  is  also already happening,  in AI recommendation systems
and personal assistants.  This approach may even make Max’s production planning
job a little easier,  by making consumption more predictable.  Even a
recommendation-based system may raise concerns,  however—about subtle
incremental  erosion of human agency,  or about loss of needed information for
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Max—and would also raise questions about the number and roles of AI agents.  Are
personal assistants Max himself,  or are they separate,  personally tuned “Mini-Max”
agents? How can I  ensure my AI assistant exclusively serves only my welfare, rather
than just doing so enough while favoring commercial  counterparties (Amazon,
Google,  Facebook)? Finally,  even if  Mini-Max works only for me, not Amazon, how
should he handle conflicts between my interests and Max’s pursuit  of social
optimality—although as we see later,  if  Max really gets all  prices right,  such
divergence might not matter.  These issues are outside my scope here but are
discussed in a preliminary way in Parson et al (2019), “Could AI drive transformative
social  progress? What would this require,”  at https://aipulse.org.
Iain M. Banks’s Culture series includes nine novels and one short story collection32.
that focus on the Culture,  a Utopian society of humanoids,  aliens,  and artificial
intelligence living in post-scarcity socialist  habitats throughout the Milky Way
galaxy.
This assumption is  of course contestable.  You may counter that if  AI is  advanced33.
enough to have Max, it is only a small step further to abolish scarcity. Perhaps. But I
suspect the link from even unlimited computation to limitless physical  abundance
has been over-stated. There are material dimensions to production and consumption
that are not fully reducible to information or computation.  Limitless abundance
would require the decoupling of economic value from any environmentally
constrained material flows to proceed faster than economic expansion with no limits
– or, alternatively, either a constant human population with consumption satiation or
over-riding finite-Earth constraints through space colonization.  The extent of
feasible aggregate decoupling between economic value and material  flows has been
a contested question in environmental  economics for at least 50 years.  See,  e.g.,
TOWARD A STEADY-STATE ECONOMY (Herman Daly ed.,  1973);  and Tim Jackson
and Peter A. Victor, “Unraveling the claims for (and against) green growth,” Science
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366:6468, 950-951 (22 Nov 2019).  Although I  am a skeptic regarding limitless
decoupling,  my argument here does not require that conditions of limitless
abundance be impossible,  merely that even unlimited projection of AI capabilities
does not confidently create them. For purposes of this paper I  stick with the
assumption that there is  still  scarcity relative to human desires,  and thus there
remains an allocation problem, as both more plausible and more interesting in its
implications.
See,  e.g.,  PETER FRASE, FOUR FUTURES (2016).  See also BASTANI,  supra note 10.34.
FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976).35.
A recent example of automation over-reach was the Tesla robots who had to be36.
replaced by people,  Samuel Gibs,  Musk Drafts Humans After Robots Slow Down
Tesla Model 3 Production,  GUARDIAN (Apr.  16,  2018,  5:36 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/16/elon-musk-humans-robots-sl
ow-down-tesla-model-3-production.
Ronald Coase,  The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).37.
This might seem a weird artificial  construct,  but like so much discussed here it38.
resembles something already happening,  a subset of the gig economy with a flat,
peer-to-peer structure.  Indeed, Mayer-Schonberger and Ramge (2018) propose such
a re-structuring of the economy into autonomous individual contractors and small
firms,  smoothly negotiating optimal collaborations with AI guidance.  Such
organization of production and labor has historical  precedents,  including the early
American (non-slave) economy of yeoman farmers and independent artisans and
shopkeepers.  For Smith,  Paine,  and other progressive thinkers before the industrial
revolution,  this provided the idealized model for an economic order that was both
equitable and liberal,  which still  oddly underpins contemporary libertarian ideology
(“oddly,”  given the vast transformation of conditions since then).
In this imagined respect of providing rapid,  responsive,  and competent customer39.
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service,  Max would differ from both the old-time central  planner and the current
oligopoly-capitalist  economy.
I  skip over the possibility that Max may know exactly what must be done but be40.
unable to do it himself, so must provide precise direction to the human doing it. This
case appears to apply more to human workers doing subtle manual activities—from
skilled trades to folding towels—than to managers.  But we might need to revisit  it.
Except insofar as Max’s objective function embodies the normative components of41.
an ideology.
Assuming Price Max works at a sufficiently granular level  that multiple similar but42.
non-identical  inputs are available,  each separately priced.
Lange’s planning system operated by setting prices for non-labor inputs (labor and43.
final  goods were excluded),  but his reason for controlling prices rather than
quantities was to support his proposed Walrasian adjustment process,  not to avoid
agency problems within the firm. In fact, Lange’s system relied on ordering managers
to adjust inputs to minimize average cost, then taxing away the firm’s entire surplus.
This was the basis for one of the strongest criticisms of Lange’s system, that it—like
quantity-based central  planning—would fail  due to neglecting managerial  incentives.
Jorge Luis Borges,  Pierre Menard,  Author of the Quixote (1939,  tr.  in LABYRINTHS44.
1962).
A Pigovian Tax or subsidy is  a charge or payment added to the price of goods45.
imposing externalities,  to restore the equality of full  social  marginal  costs and
benefits necessary for competitive equilibrium to be Pareto-optimal.  See A.C.Pigou,
The Economics of Welfare.  Macmillan and Company,  1952.
Applying Max’s price adjustments to water withdrawals—or the extraction of any46.
natural  resource—would require these actions to take place via priced transactions,
which is  not now uniformly the case.
A Value-Added Tax (VAT) is  a consumption tax placed at each stage in a supply47.
Max – A Thought Experiment: Could AI Run the Economy Better
Than Markets?
by: Edward Parson
| 79
chain, from initial  production to point of final sale, in proportion to the value added
at that stage.  See Auerbach,  Alan J.  1996.  “Tax Reform, Capital  Allocation,
Efficiency, and Growth.” In Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, edited by
Henry J.  Aaron and William G. Gale,  321–354. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
It  is  possible that these production-side data needs would change with the change48.
from an internal, single-firm objective function to a societal objective function, but I
don’t  address that question here.
In other words,  I  assume Goodhart’s law does not fundamentally impair the validity49.
of these transactional  outcomes when they are used as starting points for Max’s
calculations.  See C.A.E.  Goodhart,  Problems of monetary management:  the UK
experience, in INFLATION, DEPRESSION, AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE WEST
111  (A.Courakis ed.  1981).
Amos Tversky & Daniel  Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and50.
Biases,  185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974);  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND
SLOW (2011).
Footnote text51.
I  am assuming large sudden changes are more likely from changed scientific52.
knowledge than from changes in technological  or economic conditions,  but parallel
reasoning would apply in those cases.
As encapsulated in Gibson’s widely cited quotation in his interview on NPR’s Fresh53.
Air,  “The future is  already here,  it’s  just unevenly distributed.” Aug 31,  1993.
As I consider progressive expansions of Max’s job description, there may be reasons54.
to favor certain functions being performed by other AI systems separate from Max,
but except where I  explore this issue explicitly,  I  will  continue speaking of “Max” to
stand in for Max or other AIs.
Jeremy Kahn, “Alphabet’s DeepMind AI algorithm wins protein folding contest,”55.
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Bloomberg Technology,  Dec 2,  2018.
Danny Lewis, “AI-written novella almost wins a literary prize,” Smithsonian Magazine56.
Mar 28,  2016.
Miaozhen Zhang,  “AI’s  growing role in musical  composition,”  Medium Sept 9,  2018.57.
Note:  this point distinguishes Max’s allocations of infra-marginal  surplus from his58.
adjustments to account for externalities.  The latter would affect all  transactions,
both marginal  and infra-marginal,  but are by assumption efficiency-enhancing.
Usage of these political labels remains contested and confused, more than a century59.
after they were introduced. It is, however, clear that Max is not, and does not entail,
communism—taking communism to mean abolition of private property,  complete
social  equality,  and individual compensation according to need. Rather,  the
operative political  endpoint to compare Max is strong socialism, meaning collective
(state) control  of the means of production (a much smaller set than all  private
property);  and continued acceptance of inequalities in compensation and social
status,  although less than under capitalism and perhaps only as a transitional  state.
Although I  try to use these labels precisely,  it  is  important to note than under the
assumptions of transformative technological  change that would enable the strong
forms of Max that I  assume, it  is  possible that previous terms and definitions of
alternative political  systems become inapt.
Coase,  supra note 36;  PHILLIPS & ROZWORSKI,  supra note 10.60.
LIZ ANDERSON, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT, TANNER61.
LECTURES IN HUMAN VALUES (2015).
See id.;  Rob Lempert,  “Bezos world or levelers:  can we choose our scenario,”  from62.
UCLA AI PULSE Project workshop, May 2018,  at www.aipulse.org.
This does not preclude Max from considering worker welfare.  As suggested above,63.
one possible benefit  of Max is that workers in firms might be better treated and
happier, if Max treats employee welfare as a production externality and so punishes
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bad managers via transaction penalties.  Assuming firms and managers are informed
of the reasons for these,  they may induce firms to treat workers well  in order to
operate profitably,  without directly modifying wages.
A. Smith, An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Strahan and64.
Cadell,  1776 (Book IV,  Ch 2).
A.  Mas-Colell,  M.D. Whinston,  J.  R.  Green (1995),  Microeconomic Theory.  Oxford U.65.
Press,  Ch. 16.
Those tax revenues don’t  cease to have any role in maximizing societal  welfare,  of66.
course.  But since we’re characterizing Max as “the economy,” and not “the state,”
the subsequent disposition of those revenues and how well  they advance societal
welfare is no longer Max’s job: sending them to the government makes this their job,
not his.
Note—the price increases discussed here target only your welfare,  and are67.
additional to any price adders imposed for reasons of externalities or market-power
rents.
This does not mean Max must predict your future preferences,  only that he must68.
appropriately reflect your present preferences about tradeoffs between present
and future conditions.
Max might also be able to advance welfare in ways not captured in consumption of69.
transacted goods and services.  But this would expand Max’s job beyond the
“economy,” to the domain of the state.  I  avoid this expansion here,  but recognize I
might be attempting to draw a line that cannot hold.  Unlike in the current
decentralized,  emergent economic system, it  might be impossible to have an
algorithmic system run the economy to advance welfare without also giving it
extensive responsibilities that now lie with the state.
STUART RUSSELL, HUMAN COMPATIBLE: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE70.
PROBLEM OF CONTROL (2019) (particularly Chapters 7 and 8,  as well  as the
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technical  papers cited therein).
Given Max’s purview of just the economy, non-economic determinants of welfare71.
come into the objective function only as external  effects of economic transactions.
Noting the possibility that the correct form of discount function might not be72.
exponential,  and thus may require specifying more than one parameter.
See E.A.  Parson,  “In defense of (a little)  technocracy,”  in Parson ed.,  A SUBTLE73.
BALANCE: EVIDENCE, EXPERTISE, AND DEMOCRACY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND
GOVERNANCE, 1970–2010, Mcgill-Queens University Press,  2015.
Max is thus subject to the same critiques as earlier,  less tech-powered forms of the74.
“high modernist” agenda to rationalize public decision-making.  This concern,  and its
historical  analogies,  raise the question of the boundary between Max as “market”
and Max as all-powerful,  state-like actor,  and so shake up old debates about
legitimate state action.  Scott’s  critique of state action rests on the same
assumptions of limited knowledge and computational  ability as old critiques of
economic planning.  So what happens to the critique when advances in AI and data
falsify the assumption? I  suppose Scott’s  state still  “abstracts,”  but the term now
means something different,  because the State can see all  the graininess and
particularity of people and events that it  formerly could not.  How much then,  if
anything,  is  left  of the critique? See JAMES C.SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE
(1998);  See also various contributions in A SUBTLE BALANCE: EVIDENCE,
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parameter values may need periodic updating as conditions and values change.
(Note: this applies to the parameter values, not to the form of objective function, or
the decision to adopt Max, which both appear more constitutional  in their
foundational  character and long time horizon.)
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